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1 
THE PARENTLESS CHILD’S RIGHT TO  
A PERMANENT FAMILY 
Joseph S. Jackson* 
Lauren G. Fasig** 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite a twenty-percent reduction over the past decade, more 
than 420,000 children in the United States remain in foster care, 
and more than 110,000 of them are waiting to be adopted.1  These 
children are frequently subjected to multiple placements and lack a 
stable environment.2  State adoption statutes typically seek to 
achieve adoption for each of these children as promptly as possible, 
based on an individualized home study and judicial determination 
that the proposed adoption would be in the child’s best interests.3  
Some states, however, limit the pool of potential adoptive parents in 
one way or another.  Arkansas and Utah prohibit adoption by any 
person cohabiting in a sexual relationship without the benefit of 
marriage.4  Mississippi prohibits adoption by couples of the same 
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The authors thank Nancy Dowd, Mark Fenster, Shani King, and Barbara 
Bennett Woodhouse for their comments on an earlier draft.  We specially thank 
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, whose amicus work provided the foundation for 
much of what we present here.  We also thank Shelby Anderson and Rachelle 
Bergeron for their excellent research assistance.  In the interest of full 
disclosure, we note that this Article expands on our work on an amicus brief 
filed in support of adoptive children in Florida Department of Children & 
Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 1. Trends in Foster Care and Adoption—FY 2002–FY 2009, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb 
/stats_research/afcars/trends.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
 2. See infra notes 253–57 and accompanying text. 
 3. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-13(8) (2010) (“The Legislature 
recognizes that the best interests of the child require that the child be placed in 
the most permanent living arrangement as soon as is practicably possible.”). 
 4. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-8-304 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) 
(LexisNexis 2008).  The Arkansas statute, which also prohibits foster care by 
such persons, was declared unconstitutional in Cole v. Arkansas Department of 
Human Services, No. 60CV-08-14284 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Apr. 16, 2010), appeal 
docketed, No. CV 10-840 (Ark. Aug. 12, 2010). 
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gender.5  And Florida categorically prohibits adoption by gay men 
and lesbians.6 
In Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family 
Services, the Eleventh Circuit rebuffed a challenge to Florida’s anti-
gay adoption statute, asserting that the State has more latitude in 
establishing adoption policies than in other contexts because it acts 
“in loco parentis.”7  If the court means to say that the state has the 
same discretion a parent would have to say what is best for the 
child, that is surely wrong: parents can make decisions grounded in 
sectarian religious beliefs or invidious notions of racial superiority 
but the state cannot.8  Even apart from explicit constitutional bars 
on particular forms of state action, however, the court is wrong to 
suggest that the state has an unusually free hand in this area: to do 
so overlooks the state’s constitutional duties to the parentless child 
in its care.9 
What are those duties?  Does the provision of minimally 
adequate food, clothing, and shelter satisfy the state’s constitutional 
obligations,10 or must the state go further to facilitate the child’s 
development and “prepare him for additional obligations”?11  The 
answer, we submit, is that the state cannot merely provide the 
physical sustenance necessary to keep the child alive, but must also 
provide at least the minimum nurturing necessary to facilitate the 
child’s development into an autonomous12 human being.13  That 
 
 5. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (Supp. 2010). 
 6. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2010).  This statute was declared 
unconstitutional in Florida Department of Children & Families v. Adoption of 
X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 7. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 
809–10 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 8. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433–34 (1984).  Of course, even a 
religious justification does not give parents carte blanche to do whatever they 
please.  See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 170 (1944). 
 9. The court’s focus in Lofton was on the claims of prospective adoptive 
parents, and its assertion was that the State’s concern for the welfare of the 
adoptive child allowed it to classify prospective parents in ways that might be 
impermissible in other contexts.  Lofton, 358 F.3d at 809–10.  Although the 
foster children in Lofton also asserted a claim to constitutional protection of 
their foster family relationships, the court gave it no independent analysis, 
asserting summarily that the children had no “fundamental right to be adopted” 
and “no justifiable expectation of permanency in their relationships.”  Id. at 
811–12, 814.  Disposing of a child’s claim to constitutional protection of family 
relationships by assuming that the child’s claim merely mirrors the adult’s is an 
error several courts have committed.  See infra notes 268–76 and accompanying 
text.  For a more thoughtful analysis distinguishing the child’s interest from the 
parent’s, see Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d at 98 n.19 (Salter, J., concurring). 
 10. “[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody . . . the Constitution 
imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his 
safety and general well-being.”  DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989). 
 11. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
 12. Autonomy is a psychological state that includes the ability to regulate 
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obligation constrains the state’s choices in determining its foster 
care and adoption policies. 
Here, then, is our central thesis: an enduring attachment 
relationship with a parent figure is essential to a child’s healthy 
development into an autonomous adult.  As developmental science 
demonstrates, attachment relationships are foundational in the 
formation of the self, critical to healthy psychological adjustment, 
and necessary for the acquisition of self-regulation and social 
competence, capacities essential to meaningful autonomy.14  In 
short, children need a permanent parent15 in order to achieve “the 
ability independently to define [their] identity that is central to any 
concept of liberty.”16  Accordingly, the parentless child17 has a 
fundamental right to a permanent family relationship, and laws 
that interfere with the attainment of such a relationship must 
survive strict scrutiny in order to pass muster.  In particular, given 
the unstable placements and repeated disruptions that typify foster 
care in the United States,18 laws and policies restricting adoption 
may require such scrutiny on the basis that they directly and 
substantially interfere with the parentless child’s attainment of a 
permanent family. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  In Part I we demonstrate that 
 
one’s own behavior and to select and guide one’s own decisions through 
independence of thought, emotion, and action.  Laurence Steinberg, Autonomy, 
Conflict, and Harmony in the Family Relationship, in AT THE THRESHOLD: THE 
DEVELOPING ADOLESCENT 255, 255–76 (S. Shirley Feldman & Glen R. Elliot eds., 
1990); accord Neil S. Binder, Note, Taking Relationships Seriously: Children, 
Autonomy, and the Right to a Relationship, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1150, 1151 n.4 
(1994) (“Autonomy, as used here, refers to the ability to respond in a critical and 
self-reflective manner to the decisions that one is confronted with throughout 
one’s life.”). 
 13. See infra Part I.  This point follows directly from Youngberg v. Romeo, 
457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982), which holds that, in order to vindicate the liberty 
interests of developmentally disabled persons in state custody, the Constitution 
affirmatively requires the state to provide to such persons behavioral training 
that is calculated to minimize the need for use of physical restraints. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. By “permanent parent” we mean a primary caregiver who is attached to 
the child in an enduring relationship that is expected to last throughout their 
lives.  As we explain in Part II, below, the child’s need for attachment to a 
primary caregiver remains fundamentally important to healthy development 
throughout the child’s maturation to adulthood. 
 16. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984). 
 17. All children, not just those without parents, need a permanent family 
relationship, but when a parent’s constitutionally protected liberty interests are 
also at stake they may be in tension with those of the child, suggesting that the 
child’s rights in that context might be “substantially attenuated.”  See Smith v. 
Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846–47 (1977).  
Accordingly, we limit our claims concerning the child’s cognizable constitutional 
rights to contexts in which no competing right of a parent is present.  See infra 
Part V. 
 18. See infra notes 253–55 and accompanying text. 
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the state has an affirmative constitutional duty to provide at least 
minimally adequate nurturing to children in its custody, and we 
explain how this duty accords with existing case law.  Part II lays 
out the developmental science, documenting the critical importance 
of an enduring attachment relationship to the child’s development of 
an autonomous self.  Part III sets forth the specific constitutional 
analysis establishing the child’s fundamental right to a permanent 
family relationship.19  Part IV explains how this right constrains the 
state’s choices in establishing foster care and adoption policies for 
parentless children.  Finally, Part V explores possible objections to 
legal recognition of the child’s right to a permanent family 
relationship, leading us to conclude that careful thought is needed 
before that right is extended to contexts in which it conflicts with 
the rights of parents. 
 
 19. While courts have yet to rule on the argument we present, the scholarly 
literature expounds a number of related claims.  The kernel of our thesis can be 
found in Neil Binder’s note, Binder, supra note 12, at 1150–51.  Related claims 
are thoughtfully developed in James G. Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright: The 
State, Parentage, and the Rights of Newborn Persons, 56 UCLA L. REV. 755, 
760–61 (2009) [hereinafter Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright]; Gilbert A. 
Holmes, The Tie that Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children To Maintain 
Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 383–85 (1994); 
David D. Meyer, A Privacy Right to Public Recognition of Family Relationships?  
The Cases of Marriage and Adoption, 51 VILL. L. REV. 891, 898 (2006); Mark 
Strasser, Deliberate Indifference, Professional Judgment, and the Constitution: 
On Liberty Interests in the Child Placement Context, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL’Y 223, 223 (2008); and Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Waiting for Loving: 
The Child’s Fundamental Right to Adoption, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 297, 319–21 
(2005).  JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (2006), 
provides a sustained philosophical analysis of the associational rights that 
children should be deemed to possess, and James G. Dwyer, The Child 
Protection Pretense: States’ Continued Consignment of Newborn Babies to Unfit 
Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV. 407, 410 (2008) [hereinafter Dwyer, The Child 
Protection Pretense] grounds policy recommendations for child welfare systems 
on a summary of the developmental science.  For a somewhat contrary 
perspective on the need of children in the child welfare system for a permanent 
parent, see Sasha Coupet, Swimming Against the Great Adoption Tide: Making 
the Case for “Impermanence,” 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 405, 415 (2005).  For additional 
commentary in accord with our thesis, see Michele Benedetto, An Ounce of 
Prevention: A Foster Youth’s Substantive Due Process Right to Proper 
Preparation for Emancipation, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 381, 383–84 
(2005); Kyle Velte, Towards Constitutional Recognition of the Lesbian-Parented 
Family, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245, 285–91  (2001); Tanya M. 
Washington, Throwing Black Babies Out with the Bathwater: A Child-Centered 
Challenge to Same-Sex Adoption Bans, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1 
(2008); Cassandra S. Haury, Note, The Changing American Family: A 
Reevaluation of the Rights of Foster Parents when Biological Parental Rights 
Have Been Terminated, 35 GA. L. REV. 313 (2000); and Nicole M. Onorato, Note, 
The Right To Be Heard: Incorporating the Needs and Interests of Children of 
Nonmarital Families into the Visitation Rights Dialogue, 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & 
FAM. ADVOC. 491, 492–93 (2005). 
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I.  THE STATE’S DUTY TO CHILDREN IN CUSTODY 
A. Youngberg v. Romeo and the State’s Affirmative Constitutional 
Duty of Care 
Constitutional requirements typically function as negative 
rights.20  They prohibit governmental actors from usurping powers 
beyond the scope of their authority21 and they protect individuals 
from certain forms of state action,22 rather than imposing 
affirmative duties on the government to provide for the individual’s 
protection and welfare.23  Thus, “[a]s a general matter, a State is 
under no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for 
those within its border.”24 
However, when the government takes an individual into 
custody, the Constitution requires that at least minimally adequate 
provision be made to protect the individual’s safety and welfare.25  
This principle is well developed in the context of prison conditions26 
and extends as well to other forms of custodial confinement.27  In 
 
 20. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 552 (3d ed. 2006). 
 21. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644–
45 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (discussing the limits of the President’s 
wartime powers); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) 
(stating that the Constitution “organizes the government and . . . assigns, to 
different departments, their respective powers” and “establish[es] certain limits 
not to be transcended by those departments”). 
 22. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting from government 
infringement the freedoms of religion, speech, press, and assembly). 
 23. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
195 (1989) (stating that the Due Process Clause “is phrased as a limitation on 
the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety 
and security”); id. at 196 (“[T]he Due Process Clauses generally confer no 
affirmative right to governmental aid.”). 
 24. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982). 
 25. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199–200 (“[W]hen the State takes a person into 
its custody . . . the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume 
some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.”); see also Youngberg, 
457 U.S. at 317 (“When a person is institutionalized . . . a duty to provide 
certain services and care does exist.”). 
 26. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1981) (establishing the 
proper analysis for determining whether prison conditions violate the Eighth 
Amendment); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978) (affirming a remedial 
order addressing unconstitutional conditions of confinement in the Arkansas 
prison system); see also Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 352 n.17 (citing representative 
cases); id. at 353–54 (Brennan, J., concurring) (summarizing the extensive 
scope of litigation in lower courts).  See generally William H. Danne, Jr., 
Annotation, Prison Conditions as Amounting to Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment, 51 A.L.R. 3d 111 (1973). 
 27. See, e.g., Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (suspect 
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particular, it extends to children in state custody, not only when 
they are confined in institutional settings,28 but also when they are 
placed in foster care.29 
In all these contexts, the standard of care imposed by this duty 
is not high.  For prison inmates confined for the purpose of 
punishment, it requires that the state not adopt a posture of 
“deliberate indifference” to the prisoner’s needs.30  For those with 
 
in police custody); Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315–16 (patients at a state institution 
for the mentally retarded); Beck v. Wilson, 377 F.3d 884, 890 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(involuntarily committed patient at a state-run drug rehabilitation facility); 
Buffington v. Balt. Cnty., 913 F.2d 113, 119 (4th Cir. 1990) (pretrial detainee); 
Williams v. Nelson, 398 F. Supp. 2d 977, 986–87 (W.D. Wis. 2005) (patient at 
state treatment center for sexually dangerous persons). 
 28. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301 (1993) (juvenile aliens in an 
immigration detention facility); Smith v. District of Columbia, 413 F.3d 86, 95 
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (minor participant in a juvenile independent living program); 
A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 579 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (minor detained in a juvenile detention center); Soc’y for Good Will to 
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1243 (2d Cir. 1984) (minor 
residents of state-operated schools for the mentally retarded); Santana v. 
Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1183 (1st Cir. 1983) (minor in an industrial school and 
juvenile camp); Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1974) (minor in a 
state-run mental health hospital); Riddle v. Innskeep, 675 F. Supp. 1153, 1161–
62 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (minor at a juvenile rehabilitation center). 
 29. Doe ex rel. Johnson v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 597 F.3d 163, 175 (4th 
Cir. 2010); Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 808 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc); Norfleet 
ex rel. Norfleet v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1993); 
Yvonne L. ex rel. Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 892–93 
(10th Cir. 1992); Winston v. Children & Youth Servs. of Del. Cnty., 948 F.2d 
1380, 1390–91 (3d Cir. 1991); K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 849 
(7th Cir. 1990); Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 
1990); Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987) (en 
banc); Doe ex rel. Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 
1981); T.M. ex rel. Cox v. Carson, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1187 (D. Wyo. 2000); 
Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Eric 
L. ex rel. Schierberl v. Bird, 848 F. Supp. 303, 307 (D.N.H. 1994); LaShawn A. v. 
Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 992  (D.D.C. 1991), aff’d sub nom. LaShawn A. ex rel. 
Moore v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1993); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 
1387, 1395 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (noting the emotional harm from multiple foster care 
placements); Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 1989) 
(discussing the separation of foster children from siblings); Doe ex rel. Johanns 
v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 670 F. Supp. 1145, 1172–73 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(challenging a system of “overnight” foster care placements); Wilder v. City of 
N.Y., 568 F. Supp. 1132, 1137 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Braam ex rel. Braam v. 
Washington, 81 P.3d 851, 856–57 (Wash. 2003); Kara B. v. Dane Cnty., 555 
N.W.2d 630, 637 (Wis. 1996). 
 30. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); cf. Whitley v. Albers, 475 
U.S. 312, 326–27 (1986) (holding that the Due Process Clause affords no greater 
protection to prison inmates than does the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause). 
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mental illness or developmental disabilities confined in institutions 
for their own protection, the standard is somewhat higher: 
“professional judgment” must be exercised to provide appropriately 
for their safety and welfare.31  Likewise, for children in foster care, 
the better rule is that the “professional judgment” standard 
applies.32  Under either standard, government officials enjoy 
substantial discretion in determining how the individual’s needs 
should be met.33  Even where children are involved and there is no 
offending conduct justifying punishment, the government is not 
required to act solely on the basis of the child’s best interests: 
considerations of cost and administrative efficiency also can be 
taken into account.34 
The scope of this duty encompasses the individual’s basic needs 
for “adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care.”35  It extends 
as well to protection from physical harm: the State “has the 
unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety” for persons confined 
in its custody.36  And it has also been held to extend to protection 
from psychological harm.37  Beyond this, whenever it is necessary in 
 
 31. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321–23. 
 32. See Jordan v. City of Phila, 66 F. Supp. 2d. 638, 646 (E.D. Pa. 1999) 
(noting that the professional judgment standard of Youngberg is the “proper 
duty of care owed to a foster child”); LaShawn A., 762 F. Supp. at 996 (holding 
that liability is based on whether competent professional judgment is 
exercised); Braam, 81 P.3d at 859–60 (holding that the appropriate standard of 
care for foster children is the professional judgment standard); Kara B., 555 
N.W.2d at 638 (stating that the duty of public officials to provide foster children 
with a safe and secure placement is based on a professional judgment 
standard).  But see Brendan P. Kearse, Abused Again: Competing Constitutional 
Standards for the State’s Duty To Protect Foster Children, 29 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 385, 392 n.26 (1996) (describing the circuit split and noting 
decisions applying a “deliberate indifference” standard).  See generally id. at 
399–410 (critiquing the application of the “deliberate indifference” standard to 
the foster care context). 
 33. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317. 
 34. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304–05 (1993). 
 35. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 848–49 (7th Cir. 
1990); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1979) (noting that the 
constitutional protection of personal security “includes both physical and 
emotional well-being”); Andrea L. ex rel. Judith B. v. Children & Youth Servs. of 
Lawrence Cnty., 987 F. Supp. 418, 423 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (noting that the right of 
foster children to be free from infliction of extreme psychological harm is “well-
accepted”); Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (emotional harm in foster care); LaShawn A., 762 F. Supp. at 992–93; 
Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1009–10 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (separation 
of foster children from siblings); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1395 (N.D. 
Ill. 1989) (emotional harm from multiple foster care placements); Doe ex rel. 
Johanns v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 670 F. Supp. 1145, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(challenging a system of “overnight” foster care placements as resulting in 
emotional harm); Braam, 81 P.3d at 856–57; see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 
U.S. 1, 16–17 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing that the Eighth 
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order to vindicate an identifiable interest in liberty, the state is 
required to take affirmative steps to provide the individual in its 
custody with nurturing, training, or education. 
Youngberg v. Romeo38 provides the doctrinal foundation.  
Nicholas Romeo, a profoundly retarded twenty-six-year-old man 
with the mental capacity of an eighteen-month-old child, was 
institutionalized after his father died and his mother could no longer 
take care of him.39  Unable to speak, lacking basic self-care skills, 
and prone to violent tantrums, Nicholas was repeatedly injured 
“both by his own violence and by the reactions of other residents to 
him.”40  For his own protection and the protection of others, Nicholas 
was routinely placed in restraints for prolonged periods of time.41  
His mother filed suit as his next friend, alleging that the conditions 
of Nicholas’s confinement violated his substantive due process rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.42  Specifically, she alleged that 
Nicholas had constitutionally protected liberty interests in physical 
safety, freedom of movement, and appropriate training or 
“habilitation,” which the defendants had infringed.43 
The Court began by noting that Nicholas’s commitment did not 
“deprive him of all substantive liberty interests under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”44  As the State conceded, Nicholas had a 
substantive due process right to “adequate food, shelter, clothing, 
and medical care.”45  The question, then, was “whether liberty 
interests also exist in safety, freedom of movement, and training.”46  
Noting that both “the right to personal security” and the right to 
“freedom from bodily restraint” are core liberty interests that even 
incarcerated prisoners retain, the Court easily concluded that these 
two interests “also survive involuntary commitment.”47  “If it is cruel 
and unusual punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe 
conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily 
committed—who may not be punished at all—in unsafe 
conditions.”48 
The asserted right to training or habilitation required more 
careful analysis.  If couched as a general “right to training per se,” 
 
Amendment provides protection against “psychological harm [even] without 
corresponding physical harm”); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 273 (7th Cir. 
1996) (noting that prisoners may maintain Eighth Amendment suits “grounded 
solely on claims of psychological injury” in some circumstances). 
 38. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
 39. Id. at 309. 
 40. Id. at 309–10. 
 41. Id. at 311. 
 42. Id. at 310. 
 43. Id. at 315. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. at 315–16. 
 48. Id. 
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calculated to enable those confined in state custody “to achieve 
[their] maximum potential” or “to cope as effectively as their 
capacities permit,” the claim would present difficulties.49  “As a 
general matter, a state is under no constitutional duty to provide 
substantive services for those within its border.”50  And while “a duty 
to provide certain services and care does exist” for those whom the 
state confines in institutions, “even then a State necessarily has 
considerable discretion in determining the nature and scope of its 
responsibilities. . . .  Nor must a State ‘choose between attacking 
every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.’”51 
But the claim asserted by Nicholas was more limited.  The 
additional training and habilitation he sought—including training 
in self-care skills—was “needed to reduce his aggressive behavior,” 
and thus was related to his “constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in safety and freedom from restraint.”52  Such training, the 
Court held, was constitutionally required.53  Specifically, the Court 
concluded that Nicholas’s “liberty interests require the State to 
provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety 
and freedom from undue restraints.”54  Because individual liberty 
interests are not absolute and must be balanced against relevant 
state interests,55 the Court adopted a “professional judgment” 
standard as the measure of the state’s constitutional obligation to 
provide minimally adequate or reasonable training: “In determining 
what is ‘reasonable’ . . . courts must show deference to the judgment 
exercised by a qualified professional.”56  In other words, “courts 
[must] make certain that professional judgment in fact was 
exercised.  It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of 
several professionally acceptable choices should have been made.”57  
In the final analysis, then, the Court held that: 
[T]he State is under a duty to provide [Nicholas] with such 
training as an appropriate professional would consider 
reasonable to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to 
function free from bodily restraints.  It may well be 
unreasonable not to provide training when training could 
significantly reduce the need for restraints or the likelihood of 
violence.58 
 
 49. See id. at 318 & n.23. 
 50. Id. at 317. 
 51. Id. (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486–87 (1970)). 
 52. See id. at 318. 
 53. See id. at 319. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. at 319–20. 
 56. See id. at 322–23. 
 57. Id. at 321 (quoting Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 178 (3d Cir. 
1980) (Seitz, C.J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 58. Id. at 324. 
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Given “the kinds of treatment sought” by Nicholas in the case at 
bar, the Court stated that it “need go no further.”59  Nevertheless, 
the Court offered specific guidance for claims made in other 
contexts: 
A court properly may start with the generalization that there 
is a right to minimally adequate training.  The basic 
requirement of adequacy . . . may be stated as that training 
which is reasonable in light of identifiable liberty interests and 
the circumstances of the case.  A federal court, of course, must 
identify a constitutional predicate for the imposition of any 
affirmative duty on a State.60 
The import of this language is clear.  The state’s affirmative 
duty to provide at least “minimally adequate or reasonable training” 
is measured by the “identifiable liberty interests” at stake.61  For a 
profoundly retarded person like Nicholas—for whom “no amount of 
training will make possible his release”62—the interests in safety 
and freedom from bodily restraint define the scope of the state’s 
obligation.  But for those who, with appropriate nurturing and 
training, can achieve release from confinement, the state’s 
obligation is greater: it must provide nurturing and training 
calculated to achieve that release.  More generally, whenever any 
individual liberty interest can be identified that requires nurturing 
or training in order to be vindicated, the state is constitutionally 
obligated to provide that nurturing or training for those individuals 
confined in state custody who can benefit by it. 
To begin with a pedestrian example, some children enter foster 
care who, like Nicholas, “cannot talk and lack[] the most basic self-
care skills.”63  If they never learn to speak, to feed and dress 
themselves, to use the toilet, or otherwise to ensure their own well-
being, they will be committed to state custody and institutionalized 
as a danger to themselves.64  Such confinement infringes their 
identifiable liberty interest in freedom of movement.65  To avoid that 
infringement, the state is constitutionally obligated to provide such 
children the nurturing and training they need in order to learn to 
take care of themselves. 
Beyond the basics of self-care, children must develop certain 
 
 59. Id. at 319. 
 60. Id. at 319 n.25 (emphasis added). 
 61. Id. at 319 & n.25. 
 62. Id. at 317. 
 63. Id. at 309. 
 64. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 393.11(8) (2009) (authorizing the involuntary 
commitment to a residential facility of developmentally disabled or autistic 
person who “lacks basic survival and self-care skills”). 
 65. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (“This Court 
repeatedly has recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a 
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”). 
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psychological capacities in order to function in society as adults.66  
They must learn to regulate their emotions and behavior, or, like 
Nicholas, their out-of-control emotional outbursts will likely lead to 
injury from their own violence and others’ reactions to them.67  
Similarly, they must develop social competence, or their inability to 
interact appropriately with others will likely lead to violent 
interactions or isolation so extreme that it interferes with basic self-
care.68  Without the capacities of self-regulation and social 
competence, these children will likely present a danger to 
themselves or others as adults, requiring institutionalization69 that 
infringes their identifiable liberty interest in freedom of movement.  
To avoid that infringement, the state is constitutionally obligated to 
provide children in foster care the nurturing and training they need 
to develop the capacities of self-regulation and social competence. 
Apart from the interests in safety, freedom from bodily 
restraint, and freedom of movement, individuals possess an 
identifiable liberty interest in “an autonomy of self that includes 
freedom of thought, belief, [and] expression.”70  As the Court 
affirmed in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, “the ability 
independently to define one’s identity . . . is central to any concept of 
liberty.”71  Like the self-care skills and psychological capacities 
discussed above, this ability does not materialize on its own, but 
requires an appropriate nurturing relationship with a caregiver in 
order to develop.72  Accordingly, the state is constitutionally required 
to structure its foster care and adoption practices so as to provide 
such a relationship for the children in its care. 
In sum, while “adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical 
care” are “the essentials of the care that the State must provide”73 to 
children in its custody, these essentials do not exhaust the state’s 
responsibilities.  In addition, the state “has the unquestioned duty to 
provide reasonable safety” for these children.74  Beyond this, the 
state must provide the training and nurturing necessary to develop 
self-care skills, the psychological capacities of self-regulation and 
social competence, and the “autonomy of self”75 that is “central to 
 
 66. See infra Part II. 
 67. See infra notes 106–17 and accompanying text. 
 68. See infra  notes 106–17 and accompanying text. 
 69. See, e.g., § 393.11(8) (authorizing the involuntary commitment of a 
developmentally disabled or autistic person who “lacks basic survival and self-
care skills” or “[i]s likely to physically injure others”); id. § 394.467(1) 
(establishing similar criteria for the involuntary commitment of a mentally ill 
person to a psychiatric facility for treatment). 
 70. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
 71. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) (emphasis added). 
 72. See generally infra Part II. 
 73. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
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any concept of liberty.”76 
B. Squaring the Implications of Youngberg with Existing Case 
Law on the Constitutional Claims of Children in State Custody 
The central claim asserted here—that children in state custody 
have a substantive liberty interest in a secure and stable family 
relationship, because such a relationship is essential in order for 
these children to attain the capacities needed to function as 
autonomous adults—has not been addressed by the courts.77  
However, a number of related claims have been considered. 
Closest to the mark are cases like Braam ex rel. Braam v. 
State78 and LaShawn A. v. Dixon,79 which, relying on the state’s 
affirmative constitutional duties under Youngberg, sustained class 
action claims of children in foster care who alleged that repeated 
disruption of their placements violated their substantive due process 
right to be free from state-imposed harm.80  While their precise 
rationales have differed, courts have consistently concluded that 
Youngberg requires the state to protect foster children in its custody 
not only from physical harm, but also from serious psychological 
harm,81 including specifically the psychological and emotional harms 
that repeated disruption of attachment relationships causes.82  In 
Reno v. Flores, the Supreme Court made clear that this 
constitutional obligation does not require the state to act solely out 
of concern for the best interests of the child: “Minimum standards 
must be met, and the child’s fundamental rights must not be 
impaired; but the decision to go beyond those requirements . . . is a 
policy judgment rather than a constitutional imperative.”83  Thus, 
the Court held, where their institutional custodial placements meet 
minimal constitutional standards, children awaiting deportation 
have no right to be released to the temporary custody of a non-
relative caregiver.84  Notably, however, the Court suggested that if 
an appropriate permanent guardian or adoptive parent were willing 
 
 76. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619. 
 77. The claim was asserted in Florida Department of Children & Families 
v. X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), but was not reached 
by the court in its disposition of the case.  See id. at 91. 
 78. 81 P.3d 851 (Wash. 2003). 
 79. 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991), aff’d sub nom. LaShawn A. ex rel. 
Moore v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 80. See also B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1395 (N.D. Ill. 1989) 
(emotional harm from multiple foster care placements); Doe ex rel. Johanns v. 
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 670 F. Supp. 1145, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(challenging a system of “overnight” foster care placements). 
 81. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 82. See, e.g., LaShawn A., 762 F. Supp. at 992–93; B.H., 715 F. Supp. at 
1394–95; Doe ex rel. Johanns, 670 F. Supp. at 1175–77; Braam, 81 P.3d at 857. 
For a discussion of those harms, see infra Part II.D. 
 83. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304–05 (1993). 
 84. Id. at 304. 
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and able to take custody, continued institutional confinement would 
violate the child’s liberty interests.85 
As these cases confirm, laws that unreasonably prevent a 
parentless child from attaining a permanent family relationship 
implicate constitutional concerns, both by prolonging the child’s 
confinement in state custody,86 and by exposing the child to serious 
harm from the repeated detachments that typify foster care 
throughout the United States.87  But the analysis in these cases is 
incomplete because it overlooks the essential role a permanent 
attachment relationship plays in the formation of personal identity 
and the realization of meaningful autonomy.  By focusing attention 
on that role, the argument we present here supplements the 
analysis in these cases and reveals an additional basis on which to 
conclude that laws interfering with the attainment of a permanent 
family relationship implicate the parentless child’s constitutionally 
protected interest in liberty. 
Other cases focus not on the state’s affirmative duties under 
Youngberg, but on the constitutional protection afforded to family 
relationships under the line of cases extending back to Meyer v. 
Nebraska88 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.89  For example, in Smith 
v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, foster 
parents relied on the importance of parent-child attachments to 
press a claim for procedural due process protections before a foster 
child could be removed from the home, arguing that foster families 
have the same right to “the integrity of their family unit” as 
biological families do.90  The foster children did not join in that 
claim, but in fact opposed it, arguing that New York’s existing 
 
 85. Id. at 303 (emphasizing that the persons offering to take custody in this 
case were “unwilling to become the child’s legal guardian but [only] willing to 
undertake temporary legal custody”); id. at 304 (stating carefully that the 
Constitution does not require “nonadoptive” private custody to be substituted 
for institutional care). 
 86. The “nature and duration” of a person’s confinement in state custody 
must bear a reasonable relationship to the purpose of that confinement.  
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).  Because this principle extends to 
the context of foster care, “[u]nnecessarily prolonged confinement in 
government foster care invokes the substantive due process liberty interests of 
foster children.”  E.C. ex rel. Katz v. Sherman, No. 05-726-CV-W-SOW, 2006 WL 
1307641, at *37 (W.D. Mo. May 9, 2006); see also Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. 
Guiliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that foster children 
stated a substantive due process claim as to the duration of their placement in 
foster care); G.S. v. T.B., 985 So. 2d 978, 984 (Fla. 2008) (noting governmental 
intrusion into family relationships in the context of foster care and legal 
guardianship, as distinguished from the freedom from intrusion available in the 
context of adoption). 
 87. See infra notes 241–46 and accompanying text. 
 88. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 89. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 90. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842 
(1977). 
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procedures for removal of foster children appropriately served their 
best interests.91  The Court discussed at length the foster parents’ 
claimed liberty interest in the integrity of their families, but 
ultimately concluded that the existence of that interest did not need 
to be resolved: “even on the assumption” that foster parents had a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest, New York’s procedures 
were constitutionally adequate.92 
Likewise, Lofton involved a claim by foster parents and children 
to a constitutional right of “family integrity” protecting the foster 
family relationships from disruption.93  The court rejected that 
claim, concluding that state law gave foster parents no justifiable 
expectation that their family relationships would be protected from 
disruption.94  Because the foster parents had no right to adopt, the 
court assumed that the children had no right to be adopted.95 
In contrast to the claims made in Smith and Lofton, our 
argument here is not that foster families have a constitutional right 
to “the integrity of their family unit.”96  We assert a right of children 
not to constitutional protection of their temporary foster care 
arrangements, but to constitutional protection of their interest in a 
permanent family. 
Other court decisions addressing a child’s claimed right to 
maintain important family attachments have arisen in contexts 
where the child’s claim stands in tension with the rights of a 
custodial parent.  In Troxel v. Granville, grandparents sued under a 
state statute that allowed a court to order visitation based simply on 
a “best interest of the child” standard.97  Though the mother had not 
completely severed the child’s ties with the grandparents, the court 
below ordered additional visitation, giving no weight or deference to 
the mother’s decision.98  A plurality of the Court held that the 
statute as applied violated the mother’s substantive liberty interest 
in directing the upbringing of her child: “[T]he Due Process Clause 
does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of 
parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge 
believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.”99 
Michael H. v. Gerald D. also involved a relative’s effort to 
 
 91. Id. at 839. 
 92. Id. at 847. 
 93. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 
809–15 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 94. Id. at 814. 
 95. Id. at 811–12.  As noted above and discussed more fully below, the court 
was wrong to make this assumption.  See supra note 9; infra notes 268–77 and 
accompanying text. 
 96. Smith, 431 U.S. at 842. 
 97. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 61 (2000) (plurality opinion) (quoting 
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994)). 
 98. Id. at 71–72. 
 99. Id. at 72–73. 
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preserve a relationship with a child over the objections of the child’s 
custodial parent.100  In Michael H., a woman married to one man had 
a child fathered by another, whom she and her daughter lived with 
for a time before she reconciled with her husband.101  The biological 
father sued to establish paternity and gain rights of visitation, but 
was precluded by a California statute that conclusively presumed 
the husband to be the father of a child born in wedlock.102  The Court 
upheld the statute over the substantive due process claims of the 
biological father and the daughter, who also sought to preserve the 
relationship.103  Five of the justices recognized the father’s 
substantive due process claim, but Justice Stevens joined the 
plurality in upholding the statute, reasoning that the statutory 
scheme gave the father an opportunity to obtain visitation rights by 
establishing that visitation would be in his daughter’s best 
interests.104 
As discussed more fully in Part V, Troxel and Michael H. are 
grounded in appropriate concern for the right of a custodial parent 
to direct the upbringing of her children—a concern that is 
completely absent when parental rights have been terminated and 
the child is in the custody of the state.  These cases, therefore, pose 
no obstacle to recognition of a parentless child’s fundamental right 
to a permanent family relationship.105 
II.  THE ROLE OF ATTACHMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSON 
In order to grow into a self-sufficient, autonomous individual, 
capable of at least minimal functioning in society, each of us must 
develop a number of capabilities by the time we reach adulthood.  
Those capabilities cluster into three domains: self-regulation, social 
competence, and the ability to learn.106  These domains are not 
independent, but rather operate together to support success in all of 
 
 100. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113–16 (1989) (plurality 
opinion). 
 101. Id. at 113–15. 
 102. Id. at 115–16. 
 103. Id. at 128–31; id. at 136 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 104. Id. at 136. 
 105. Indeed, close analysis of the Troxel opinions suggests that the case 
affirmatively supports constitutional recognition of children’s interests in 
maintaining family relationships.  See Susan E. Lawrence, Substantive Due 
Process and Parental Rights: From Meyer v. Nebraska to Troxel v. Granville, 8 
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 71, 100–11 (2006); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Talking 
About Children’s Rights in Judicial Custody and Visitation Decision-Making, 36 
FAM. L.Q. 105, 112–14 (2002). 
 106. For a thorough explanation of the concepts discussed in this paragraph, 
see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., FROM NEURONS TO 
NEIGHBORHOODS: THE SCIENCE OF EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT 89–217 
(Jack P. Shonkoff & Deborah A. Phillips eds., 2000) [hereinafter NEURONS TO 
NEIGHBORHOODS]. 
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the tasks of human functioning.107  Within the domain of self-
regulation, the child must master the regulation of emotion, 
behavior, and attention.108  Each of these serves as the foundation 
for more advanced functioning that comes with the increasing 
demands of childhood, eventually yielding self-control, self-
awareness, and independent functioning, the hallmarks of the 
autonomous individual.109  Additionally, every child must develop 
social competence, which includes the ability to communicate with 
others and the ability to form relationships.110  These skills are 
essential to existing in the inherently social environment of human 
societies.  Finally, each child must be able to learn.111  In this 
context, learning includes not only acquiring new information and 
solving problems, but also developing the ability to adapt to 
changing environmental input and demands.  The interdependence 
of these three domains is easy to see.  For example, the ability to 
learn is clearly necessary for developing self-regulation and social 
competence, and the abilities to regulate attention and to 
communicate are essential to learning and adaptability. 
More than six decades of research confirms that attachment 
relationships in childhood are necessary for the development of 
these capabilities.112  Starting in the late 1930s, numerous child care 
professionals in the United States and in Europe noted a disturbing 
trend of children, many of whom had been raised in institutions, 
who appeared to have no concern or feeling for anyone but 
themselves.113  Many were withdrawn and isolated, while others 
were overactive and abusive toward peers.114  By the time they were 
teenagers, they had histories of criminality and violence.115  At about 
the same time, John Bowlby reported that children who had been 
separated from their parents during World War II were depressed or 
otherwise emotionally disturbed, and mentally immature.  The 
 
 107. Id. at 121. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Ross A. Thompson & Rebecca Goodvin, The Individual Child: 
Temperament, Emotion, Self, and Personality, in DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE 427, 
427–61 (Marc H. Bornstein & Michael E. Lamb eds., 6th ed. 2010). 
 110. See NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 106, at 163. 
 111. See id. at 125. 
 112. See, e.g., Lisa J. Berlin & Jude Cassidy, Relations Among Relationships: 
Contributions from Attachment Theory and Research, in HANDBOOK OF 
ATTACHMENT 688, 688–712 (Jude Cassidy & Phillip R. Shaver eds., 1999); 
Michael E. Lamb & Charlie Lewis, The Role of Parent-Child Relationships in 
Child Development, in DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE, supra note 109, at 469–517; 
Thompson & Goodvin, supra note 109, at 414; Dwyer, The Child Protection 
Pretense, supra note 19, at 415–35; Douglas F. Goldsmith et al., Separation and 
Reunification: Using Attachment Theory and Research To Inform Decisions 
Affecting the Placements of Children in Foster Care, JUV. & FAM. CT. J., Spring 
2004, at 1. 
 113. JOHN BOWLBY, CHILD CARE AND THE GROWTH OF LOVE 33–34 (1953). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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orphaned children tended not to develop normal emotional 
connections to others, a characteristic shared by the 
institutionalized children.116  Bowlby’s research with these groups 
captured the children’s extreme reactions to disruptions of their 
attachment relationships, including fearful expressions, angry 
protests, desperate searching behaviors, sadness, despair, and over 
time, detachment, subdued physical activity, and subdued emotional 
expressiveness.117 
On the basis of these observations, René Spitz conducted the 
now classic studies exploring how the lack of adequate caregiving 
affects development.118  His research documented that in spite of 
receiving good physical care, children who received little or no 
emotional and social interaction with a regular caregiver were 
generally sickly, and both physically and cognitively retarded.119  
Research in this area blossomed and spread from observational 
studies of children to experimental work with monkeys.  Harry 
Harlow conducted the famous rhesus monkey studies, in which he 
reared infant monkeys in isolation from birth, comparing their 
development to that of monkeys raised normally by their mothers.120  
The isolated monkeys showed severe behavioral disturbances when 
finally placed with other monkeys, such as compulsive self-biting, 
rocking, and aggression.121  To examine the psychoanalytic claim 
that infant attachments were based on the provision of food by the 
mother, Harlow conducted further research in which he removed 
infant monkeys from their mothers and placed them with one of two 
surrogates.122  The “wire cage mother” was made only of wire, but 
delivered food and water.  The “terrycloth mother” was covered with 
soft material that might offer comfort but delivered no food.  The 
infant monkeys with “terrycloth mothers” spent significantly more 
time clinging to and close to the surrogates than did infants with 
“wire cage mothers.”123  These infants would take sustenance and 
then move away from the surrogates.124  This research demonstrated 
that contact comfort was more important to the infant monkeys’ 
 
 116. See id. at 36–38. 
 117. Roger Kobak, The Emotional Dynamics of Disruptions in Attachment 
Relationships, in HANDBOOK OF ATTACHMENT, supra note 112, at 21–43. 
 118. Robert N. Emde, Individual Meaning and Increasing Complexity: 
Contributions of Sigmund Freud and René Spitz to Developmental Psychology, 
in A CENTURY OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 203, 218 (Ross D. Parke et al. 
eds., 1994).  To view examples of this work, see Videotape: Psychogenic Disease 
in Infancy (René A. Spitz 1952), available at http://www.archive.org/details 
/PsychogenicD?start=659.5. 
 119. Emde, supra note 118, at 218. 
 120. ROBERT SIEGLER ET AL., HOW CHILDREN DEVELOP 415–16 (2d ed. 2006). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Harry Harlow, The Nature of Love, 13 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 673, 674–76. 
 123. Harlow, supra note 122, at 676–77. 
 124. Id. at 676. 
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attachment than was receiving life-sustaining food and water.125 
Attachment theory and its corresponding field of research grew 
out of this early work, leading ultimately to a vast body of scientific 
research documenting the critical importance of at least one warm, 
sensitive, continuous relationship with a caregiver to children’s 
successful development.126  This child development research 
overwhelmingly shows that children form strong bonds of 
attachment to their parents early in life, which strengthen and 
develop as children grow older.127  These attachment relationships do 
not depend on biological connection, but form with any adult who 
“on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction, 
companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child’s 
psychological needs, as well as the child’s physical needs.”128  
Attachment relationships “shape the development of self-awareness, 
social competence, conscience, emotional growth and emotion 
regulation, learning and cognitive growth.”129  They “engage children 
in the human community in ways that help them define who they 
are, what they can become, and how and why they are important to 
other people.”130  In short, children need the attachments that form 
in a secure and stable family relationship in order to develop into 
autonomous, socially responsible, psychologically well-adjusted 
adults.131  Indeed, courts have long recognized that “children require 
secure, stable, long-term, continuous relationships with their 
parents or foster parents.”132 
A. The Formation of Attachments in Infancy 
Developmental scientists define an attachment relationship as a 
specific, enduring emotional bond between two individuals.133  
Infants and young children become attached to the individuals who 
establish with them a pattern of consistent, predictable responses to 
their signals and needs.134  Attachment relationships appear to be 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. See generally HANDBOOK OF ATTACHMENT, supra note 112; ROBIN L. 
HARWOOD ET AL., CULTURE AND ATTACHMENT: PERCEPTIONS OF THE CHILD IN 
CONTEXT (1995). 
 127. See, e.g., 1 JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS 260, 350 (2d ed. 1982). 
 128. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 98 
(2d ed. 1979). 
 129. NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 106, at 265. 
 130. Nat’l Scientific Council on the Developing Child, Young Children 
Develop in an Environment of Relationships 1 (Harvard Univ. Ctr. on the 
Developing Child, Working Paper No. 1, 2004). 
 131. Goldsmith et al., supra note 112, at 1–2. 
 132. Lehman ex rel. Lehman v. Lycoming Cnty. Children’s Servs. Agency, 
458 U.S. 502, 513 (1982). 
 133. See generally Jude Cassidy, The Nature of the Child’s Ties, in 
HANDBOOK OF ATTACHMENT, supra note 112, at 3, 11–14; Lamb & Lewis, supra 
note 112, at 469–80. 
 134. Lamb & Lewis, supra note 112, at 475–76. 
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biologically based and to have evolved to provide protection for the 
virtually helpless young human.135  The infant “appears to be so 
strongly motivated and prepared to develop attachments . . . that, 
given the opportunity to interact regularly with even a modestly 
responsive caregiver, he . . . will develop an emotional tie to that 
person.”136 
Although the infant is predisposed to form attachment 
relationships, the relationship is shaped by the environment of 
caregiving.137  Healthy or secure attachments138 between children 
 
 135. See NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 106, at 230. 
 136. Id. 
 137. JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS: ATTACHMENT 166 (1969); 
Cassidy, supra note 133, at 6.  See generally Joan B. Kelly & Michael E. Lamb, 
Using Child Development Research To Make Appropriate Custody and Access 
Decisions for Young Children, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 297 (2000). 
 138. Attachment theory classifies an individual’s attachment status 
according to four categories: secure; insecure/avoidant; insecure/resistant; and 
disorganized.  BARBARA M. NEWMAN & PHILLIP R. NEWMAN, DEVELOPMENT 
THROUGH LIFE: A PSYCHOSOCIAL APPROACH 153 (9th ed. 2006); Nancy S. 
Weinfield et al., The Nature of Individual Differences in Infant-Caregiver 
Attachment, in HANDBOOK OF ATTACHMENT, supra note 112, at 68, 68–69.  The 
pattern of interactions between the child and caregiver reveals the underlying 
character of the attachment.  The four attachment classifications describe the 
child’s perception of the availability of the caregiver in times of need and the 
organization of the child’s responses to the caregiver given those perceptions of 
availability.  See NEWMAN & NEWMAN, supra, at 153. 
Secure attachments are those in which the child is able to rely on the 
caregiver as an available source of comfort, but is also comfortable to explore 
the world away from the caregiver and develop mastery of the environment; the 
child’s confidence in the sensitivity and responsiveness of the caregiver 
engenders confidence in his own interaction with the world.  See Weinfield et 
al., supra. 
Children with insecure/avoidant and insecure/resistant attachments have 
not experienced consistent availability, responsiveness, and sensitivity to needs 
from caregivers.  Caregivers of children with insecure/avoidant attachments 
seem to reject their children, spending less time holding, soothing, and 
interacting with them.  The children’s attempts to interact may be met with 
indifference or rebuke.  In times of stress, children with insecure/avoidant 
attachments tend to avoid the caregiver and often fail to seek comfort or 
assistance.  These children are also less likely to actively engage the 
surrounding environment.  See NEWMAN & NEWMAN, supra. 
Children with insecure/resistant attachments to caregivers alternate 
between clinging to the caregiver for comfort and pulling away from the 
caregiver in anger.  Caregivers of insecure/resistant children tend to be 
inconsistent in their responsiveness to the child, sometimes ignoring clear 
signals of need and other times intruding upon the child to make contact, 
appearing to interact with the child based solely on their own needs rather than 
in balance with the needs of the child.  Id.  Because children with both 
insecure/avoidant and insecure/resistant attachments are not able to explore 
their environments without worry, they cannot achieve the same self-confidence 
and mastery of the environment as securely attached individuals.  Weinfield et 
al., supra, at 69–70. 
The fourth category of attachment status, disorganized attachments, is 
that in which the child has no consistent way of coping with stress.  The child’s 
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and their caregivers are formed when the care received is sensitive, 
warm, and responsive.139  Through regular interaction with her 
caregivers during the first months, the infant learns three key 
principles that serve as the foundation of the attachment 
relationship.140  First, the infant learns that in social interactions, 
partners take turns acting and reacting to each other.141  The child 
comes to understand this concept of reciprocity through the give and 
take experienced as the caregiver engages the infant in smiles, 
talking, and other various interactions during routine care.142  For 
example, in response to the caregiver’s overtures, the infant gurgles, 
smiles, or waves an arm, leading the caregiver to react with 
additional communication efforts.143 
Second, the infant learns that her behavior can affect the 
behavior of others in consistent and predictable ways.144  Time after 
time, crying brings the caregiver to her side and leads to satiated 
hunger.  Babbling results in smiles and talking from the caregiver.  
This initial understanding of agency leads to the third principle, 
trust.145  Through repeated interactions, the infant learns that the 
caregiver “can be counted on to respond when signaled.”146  The child 
comes to expect certain patterns of response from the caregiver, and 
each response reinforces the expectation.147  This knowledge leads to 
 
behavior is contradictory and often unpredictable, seeming to convey feelings of 
extreme fear or utter confusion in relation to the caregiver.  Caregivers of 
children with disorganized attachments tend to be either negative and hostile 
toward their children or passive, seeming to be afraid of their children, or 
untrusting in their own ability to care for them.  See NEWMAN & NEWMAN, 
supra, at 153–54.  Children with disorganized attachments are also less likely 
to explore and master the world around them.  See Jay Belsky et al., Instability 
of Infant-Parent Attachment Security, 32 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 921, 921–24 
(1996). 
 139. The relationship between the development of healthy attachments and 
parental care that is more affectionate, more effective in soothing the child, less 
intrusive, and more sensitive to the child’s needs has been established in 
numerous cultural groups and across numerous studies.  See, e.g., MARY D. 
SALTER AINSWORTH ET AL., PATTERNS OF ATTACHMENT 137–53 (1978); Marianne 
S. De Wolff & Marinus H. van Ijzendoorn, Sensitivity and Attachment: A Meta-
Analysis on Parental Antecedents of Infant Attachment, 68 CHILD DEV. 571 
(1997); Byron Egeland & Ellen A. Farber, Infant-Mother Attachment: Factors 
Related to Its Development and Changes over Time, 55 CHILD DEV. 753 (1984); 
German Posada et al., Through Columbian Lenses: Ethnographic and 
Conventional Analysis of Maternal Care and Their Associations with Secure 
Base Behavior, 40 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 508 (2004). 
 140. Lamb & Lewis, supra note 112, at 473. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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a fundamental trust on which the attachment relationship is built.148  
The rhythm of interaction established as the infant learns 
reciprocity, agency, and trust is an important component of the 
attachment relationship, creating consistency in the child’s 
environment over time and contributing a source of familiarity and 
comfort that continues even when the interactions between child 
and caregiver evolve with the child’s development.149  This rhythm of 
interaction remains important throughout the child’s life.150 
Although the interaction style in the attachment relationship 
may remain consistent, attachment behaviors differ across the 
various stages of development.  Attachment in infancy looks 
different than attachment in elementary school.  One way to 
measure the health or security of attachment relationships at any 
developmental stage is to evaluate the degree of trust a child 
develops in the reliability of specific people.151  This view of 
attachment is particularly appropriate as the child moves past the 
early years of total dependence on others and into the more 
independent developmental phases of the preschool years and 
beyond.  In healthy attachment relationships, the caregiver’s 
response consistently meets the child’s needs.152  Over time, this 
continuous and predictable responsiveness, behavior modeling, and 
nurturing enable the child to thrive across all domains of 
development and provide the basis for the child’s understanding of 
human interaction.153  Even when the caregiver input is less optimal, 
contributing to less healthy attachment relationships, the child 
learns a basic template of how relationships work.154  In such 
situations, the child may learn that the caregiver is predictably 
unavailable, or even predictably unpredictable.155  Still, these 
relationships form the child’s basis for understanding human 
relationships and what it is to be a person. 
B. The Role of Attachments in the Emergence of the Self 
The developing attachment relationship spurs the creation of 
neurological pathways in the child’s brain that lead to psychological 
advances, including the emergence of a sense of self.156  Every 
experience causes an electrochemical reaction in the brain.157  These 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. at 472–73. 
 150. See infra notes 178–84 and accompanying text. 
 151. Lamb & Lewis, supra note 112, at 473. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 106, at 236. 
 154. See id. at 241. 
 155. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (describing different 
categories of attachment relationships). 
 156. See Thompson & Goodvin, supra note 109, at 427, 447–52. 
 157. See Geraldine Dawson et al., The Role of Early Experience in Shaping 
Behavioral and Brain Development and Its Implications for Social Policy, 12 
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reactions stimulate the neurons involved, leading to neuronal 
growth and strengthening.158  Thus, through experience, connections 
between neurons in the brain are formed.  Repeated experiences 
lead to pathways that are strengthened with each occurrence.159  
These pathways join together to form networks of neuronal 
connections, creating the hardwiring of brain functioning.  
Attachment relationships are the major environmental factor—the 
“active ingredient” in the environment—that shapes the 
development of the child’s brain during its period of maximal 
growth.160  When a caregiver provides a pattern of consistent, 
predictable responses to the child’s signals and needs, forming an 
attachment relationship, the repeated experiences generate robust 
neuronal connections in the developing child’s brain.  In short, 
healthy “development of a child’s brain architecture depends upon 
the establishment of [attachment] relationships.”161 
As the baby gains more experience and builds understanding of 
reciprocity, agency, and trust, the child’s expectations solidify into a 
model that can be used to predict the behavior of others and to 
understand new experiences.  These models are talked about in 
behavioral science as internal working models.162 
An internal working model serves two functions.  As described 
above, the model lets the child know what to expect from her 
attachment figures.163  Additionally, the internal working model 
shapes the child’s understanding of and feelings about herself.164  At 
the same time that the child develops expectations about behaviors 
and responses from the caregiver, she develops expectations about 
her own behaviors and preferences.165  So for example, the toddler 
who tries kicking a soccer ball receives praise from the caregiver for 
 
DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 695, 697 (2000) (explaining the role of chemical 
reactions in the brain, how memories are formed, and how neuronal growth 
reinforces those developments). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 697–98. 
 160. NAT’L SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL ON THE DEVELOPING CHILD, THE SCIENCE OF 
EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT 6 (2007), available at http://developingchild 
.harvard.edu/index.php/download_file/-/view/67/. 
 161. Nat’l Scientific Council on the Developing Child, supra note 130, at 1. 
 162. Internal working models are the child’s mental representations of the 
relationship between the child and the caregiver, based on shared experiences.  
The model governs the ongoing attachment relationship, in that the child 
interprets and predicts the caregiver’s behavior, thoughts, and feelings based on 
his or her established patterns of interaction.  This consideration of the 
caregiver’s behavior, then, serves to support and regulate the child’s own 
behavior.  Internal working models are continuously under revision as new 
experiences with the caregiver are added to the model.  Inge Bretherton & 
Kristine A. Munholland, Internal Working Models in Attachment Relationships, 
in HANDBOOK OF ATTACHMENT, supra note 112, at 89, 90–91. 
 163. See Thompson & Goodvin, supra note 109, at 414. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 414–15. 
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the effort, leading the child to repeat the behavior.  Ongoing 
feedback from the caregiver providing praise, advice, and even 
participation as the caregiver kicks the ball back to the toddler leads 
the child to seek to play with the soccer ball.  The caregiver may 
begin to talk about the child’s love for soccer with the child and 
others in the child’s environment, labeling the child as a “soccer 
player.”  Over time, the child comes to think of himself as a soccer 
player and as someone who loves soccer. 
In addition, many of the child’s abilities are mastered within 
early social relationships, structured and supported by the 
caregiver.  With experience, these abilities emerge as capacities of 
the child.166  For example, a two-year-old may grab her toy cat from 
her older brother while slapping him in frustration.  The father 
takes her hand and explains the rules about sharing, hitting, and 
asking for the things that she wants.  The next time she tries to 
claim a valuable item from her brother, the father reminds her of 
the rules and helps her to ask for the toy rather than grabbing it.  
Each time a similar scenario occurs, the father helps her to 
remember the rules and to comply, over time allowing and expecting 
the child to be better able to independently remember and to act on 
the rules.  Eventually the child responds to her brother’s snatching 
of her toy by inhibiting the urge to take it back and instead asking 
for its return.  The child has now developed the ability to regulate 
her own behavior in social interactions, an essential skill for 
mastering social competence.  The child is also able to generalize 
this response pattern to other situations with other people.  This 
new capacity is added to the child’s internal working model, 
elaborating her understanding of herself and how relationships 
function.167 
Accordingly, there is first an organized relationship with the 
caregiver; this organization, then, serves as the foundation for the 
organization of the self.168  In this way, ongoing feedback from the 
caregiving environment further refines the child’s understanding of 
how others see her, expectations held by others regarding her 
behavior, and her own expectations, abilities, and feelings.169 
The parent-infant attachment thus provides “a crucial 
foundation for the growth of healthy self-regard, because of its 
influence on the young child’s developing self-representations.”170  
Through such a relationship, parental values, expectations, and 
beliefs are transmitted in ongoing feedback about behavior, and this 
 
 166. L.S. VYGOTSKY, MIND IN SOCIETY 70–72 (Michael Cole et al. eds., 1981); 
see also NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 106, at 113 (discussing this 
process in the context  of children’s development of emotional self-regulation). 
 167. Bretherton & Munholland, supra note 162, at 89. 
 168. See generally Louis W. Sander, Infant and Caretaking Environment, in 
EXPLORATIONS IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY 129 (E. James Anthony ed., 1975). 
 169. Thompson & Goodvin, supra note 109, at 450. 
 170. Id. 
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feedback strongly influences children’s self-representations.171  Over 
time, these patterns of beliefs, attitudes, expectations, and 
behaviors emerge as the child’s own personality.172  Although this 
process occurs during the preschool years, the person the child is to 
be continues to develop, adding to the complexity and organization 
of the internal working models of self and other throughout 
childhood.173  The emergence of autonomy in late adolescence is 
associated with the child’s attachment relationships.174  Just as 
attachments in infancy provide the child with a secure base from 
which to explore the environment with the knowledge that the 
caregiver will be available to help and comfort when needed, healthy 
attachment relationships in adolescence support continued closeness 
while encouraging the expression of differences.175  Caregivers 
facilitate identity exploration through an open exchange of ideas 
and an appropriate level of challenge.176  “Attachment experiences” 
are thus “vital in the formation of the person.”177 
C. The Ongoing Importance of Attachments to the Child’s 
Development of Self-Regulation, Social Competence, and Ability To 
Learn 
It is not just the character of the early attachment relationship 
that shapes later development; the ongoing nature of the parent-
child relationship is fundamental to adult outcomes.  Research now 
indicates that children vary significantly in whether early 
attachments have an enduring impact on their development, and it 
is the continuity of caregiving and interaction style between parent 
and child in the attachment relationship that shapes later 
developmental outcomes.178  For example, a secure attachment in 
infancy does not predict more positive social functioning when the 
mother’s interaction style has changed from warm and supportive to 
insensitive and intrusive.179  However, when parents interact 
 
 171. Id. at 451–52. 
 172. See L. ALAN SROUFE ET AL., THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSON: THE 
MINNESOTA STUDY OF RISK AND ADAPTATION FROM BIRTH TO ADULTHOOD 25–27 
(2005). 
 173. See Robert S. Marvin & Preston A. Britner, Normative Development: 
The Ontogeny of Attachment, in HANDBOOK OF ATTACHMENT, supra note 112, at 
44, 62–63. 
 174. See Ross A. Thompson, The Legacy of Early Attachments, 71 CHILD DEV. 
145, 146 (2000). 
 175. Id. at 148–50. 
 176. Karen M. Best et al., Predicting Young Adult Competencies: Adolescent 
Era Parent and Individual Influences, 12 J. ADOLESCENT RES. 90, 107–09 
(1997). 
 177. L. Alan Sroufe, Attachment and Development: A Prospective, 
Longitudinal Study from Birth to Adulthood, 7 ATTACHMENT & HUM. DEV. 349, 
365 (2005). 
 178. See Thompson, supra note 174, at 145–51. 
 179. See generally Martha Farrell Erikson et al., The Relationship Between 
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sensitively and warmly with their children not just in infancy but 
also throughout childhood, the children are likely to develop 
favorably.180 
Attachment relationships serve the primary function of 
organizing behavior during the child’s infancy.181  As the child 
develops and the environmental demands on the child change, the 
functions of the attachment relationship change as well.  For the 
toddler who is faced with the tasks of learning to seek goals and 
handle new-found abilities such as expressing feelings and desires, 
interaction with attachment figures provides assistance in 
managing the tension that arises between these skills and safety 
and social demands.182  A responsive mother helps the frustrated 
toddler to manage the emotions that might lead to a tantrum, and to 
instead persist in working toward the goal, channeling the emotion 
and energy into a strategy to succeed.  Thus, the attachment 
relationship provides the toddler with the safe space needed to 
develop emotion regulation.183  “Attachment to a primary caregiver is 
essential to the development of emotional security and social 
conscience.”184 
During the preschool years, the child’s major developmental 
tasks include growing her curiosity, self-direction, and self-
management, as well as building her self-confidence and social 
skills.185  Research shows that children’s attachment relationships 
contribute to their success in meeting these benchmarks.186  
Attachment relationships affect children’s ability to interact with 
unfamiliar people,187 their memory processes,188 their understanding 
of emotion,189 their understanding of friendship,190 their conscience 
 
Quality of Attachment and Behavior Problems in Preschool in a High-Risk 
Sample, 50 MONOGRAPHS SOC’Y FOR RES. CHILD DEV., Nos. 1–2, 1985, at 147; 
Douglas M. Teti et al., And Baby Makes Four: Predictors of Attachment Security 
Among Preschool-Age Firstborns During the Transition to Siblinghood, 67 
CHILD DEV. 579 (1996). 
 180. LAURA E. BERK, INFANTS AND CHILDREN 277 (5th ed. 2005). 
 181. See SROUFE ET AL., supra note 172, at 87–88 (discussing the caregiver’s 
interaction with infants as a behavioral organizational system). 
 182. See NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 106, at 229–30. 
 183. See SROUFE ET AL., supra note 172, at 106–07. 
 184. Comm. on Early Childhood, Adoption, and Dependent Care, Am. Acad. 
of Pediatrics, Developmental Issues for Young Children in Foster Care, 106 
PEDIATRICS 1145, 1146 (2000) [hereinafter Young Children in Foster Care]. 
 185. These tasks are directly related to the self-regulation and social 
competence essential for autonomous functioning in society. 
 186. See generally Marvin & Britner, supra note 173, at 55–62 (discussing 
the development of attachment during the toddler and preschool years). 
 187. See Ross A. Thompson, Empathy and Its Origins in Early Development, 
in INTERSUBJECTIVE COMMUNICATION AND EMOTION IN EARLY ONTOGENY 144, 
144–45 (Stein Bråten ed., 1998). 
 188. See Jay Belsky et al., Infant Attachment Security and Affective-
Cognitive Information Processing at Age 3, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 111, 111–14 (1996). 
 189. Deborah J. Laible & Ross A. Thompson, Attachment and Emotional 
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development,191 and their reactivity to stressful situations.192  
Additionally, the early attachment relationship also serves as a 
prototype for relationships developed with others beyond the 
immediate family as the child’s social circle widens, and for later 
social relationships.193 
Attachment relationships are vital for the maturing child, not 
only in the early years, but throughout development.  Attachment 
relationships with parents underlie the child’s ability to emerge 
from the intimacy of the family to seek additional social 
relationships.194  Research demonstrates that rather than opposing 
adolescents’ need to establish autonomy, as one might expect, the 
parental-attachment relationship plays a vital role in helping 
adolescents successfully meet this challenge.195  Attachment 
relationships with parents contribute to adolescents’ self-esteem, 
social competence, emotional adjustment, behavioral self-control, 
and sense of identity.196  The importance of attachment relationships 
 
Understanding in Preschool Children, 34 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1038, 
1038–44 (1998). 
 190. Kathryn A. Park & Everett Waters, Security of Attachment and 
Preschool Friendships, 60 CHILD DEV. 1076, 1076–80 (1989). 
 191. Grazyna Kochanska, Multiple Pathways to Conscience for Children with 
Different Temperaments: From Toddlerhood to Age 5, 33 DEVELOPMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 228, 236–39 (1997). 
 192. Megan R. Gunnar et al., Stress Reactivity and Attachment Security, 29 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 191, 200–02 (1996). 
 193. NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 106, at 236.  The attachment 
relationship is also related to the child’s competence in elementary school, 
including success with peers and academic abilities.  Research shows that 
attachment is related to overall academic performance in elementary school, 
achievement test scores, attentiveness in school, and emotional health.  See 
SROUFE ET AL., supra note 172, at 163–65.  In fact, throughout childhood, 
attachment relationships are consistently related to functioning across social, 
emotional, and cognitive domains.  For example, a large-scale research study 
following children and their attachment relationships over thirty years 
concluded that a healthy attachment was positively related to all measures of 
competence for fifteen-year-olds, including ratings of leadership, planning, self-
confidence, and social skills—all capacities related to autonomous functioning.  
Id. at 179–82. 
 194. NEWMAN & NEWMAN, supra note 138, at 156. 
  195. Joseph P. Allen & Deborah Land, Attachment in Adolescence, in 
HANDBOOK OF ATTACHMENT, supra note 112, at 319, 319; see also Joseph P. Allen 
et al., Longitudinal Assessment of Autonomy and Relatedness in Adolescent-
Family Interactions as Predictors of Adolescent Ego Development and Self-
Esteem, 65 CHILD DEV. 179, 181–92 (1994) (studying the importance of 
establishing autonomy and relatedness in adolescent-family interactions); R. 
Chris Fraley & Keith E. Davis, Attachment Formation and Transfer in Young 
Adults’ Close Friendships and Romantic Relationships, 4 PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 
131, 132–33 (1997). 
 196. See Consuelo Arbona & Thomas G. Power, Parental Attachment, Self-
Esteem, and Antisocial Behaviors Among African American, European 
American, and Mexican American Adolescents, 50 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 40, 
40 (2003); Maureen E. Kenny & Kenneth G. Rice, Attachment to Parents and 
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with parents continues into the college years and beyond.  College 
students’ attachment to their parents relates to their academic 
performance and their social and psychological adjustment during 
the transition to college.197  The attachment relationship with 
parents serves as a model for other relationships as young adults 
establish their own lives, affecting their ability to successfully form 
close relationships both with romantic partners and with friends 
after leaving home.198 
Attachment relationships also “buffer young children against 
the development of serious behavior problems, in part by 
strengthening the human connections and providing the structure 
and monitoring that curb violent or aggressive tendencies.”199  This 
remains true throughout childhood.200  Attachment relationships 
thus form “the cornerstone for healthy psychological adjustment.”201 
D. The Need for Stability in Attachment Relationships 
Disruptions in attachment relationships—and in particular 
repeated disruptions—cause profound emotional and psychological 
harm.202  Disruption causes children to “not only suffer separation 
distress and anxiety but also setbacks in the quality of their next 
attachments, which will be less trustful.”203  Displacing children’s 
attachment relationships upsets the continuity of caregiving, which 
usually provides the consistent, enduring environmental input, 
 
Adjustment in Late Adolescent College Students: Current Status, Applications, 
and Future Considerations, 23 COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 433, 433–39 (1995). 
 197. See Simon Larose et al., Attachment State of Mind, Learning 
Dispositions, and Academic Performance During the College Transition, 41 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 281, 283 (2005). 
 198. Miri Scharf et al., Adolescents’ Attachment Representations and 
Developmental Tasks in Emerging Adulthood, 40 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 
430, 439–41 (2004). 
 199. NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 106, at 265. 
 200. For example, research studies have confirmed that family closeness and 
attachment relationships are the most important factors associated with teens’ 
choices to not smoke, to use less alcohol and other drugs, to delay sexual 
activity, and to forego suicide attempts.  See generally Michael D. Resnick et al., 
Protecting Adolescents from Harm: Findings from the National Longitudinal 
Study on Adolescent Health, 278 JAMA 823 (1997). 
 201. DAVID M. BRODZINSKY ET AL., CHILDREN’S ADJUSTMENT TO ADOPTION 13 
(1998). 
 202. This harm is evidenced by changes in brain functioning.  The stress 
caused by disruptions of attachment has enduring effects on the regulation of 
the Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal (“HPA”) axis of the brain.  The HPA axis is 
associated with the regulation of cortisol and is responsible for regulating the 
body’s response to stress and for transmitting neurochemical information for 
the processes of the sympathetic nervous system, the system that maintains 
homeostasis in the body and directs the flight-or-fight response that might be 
necessary for immediate survival.  See James R. Corbin, Reactive Attachment 
Disorder: A Biopsychosocial Disturbance of Attachment, 24 CHILD ADOLESC. SOC. 
WORK J. 539, 539–44 (2007). 
 203. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 128, at 33. 
W03_JACKSON 3/16/2011  8:26:07 PM 
28 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 
modeling, and support necessary for the child’s emotional, social, 
and cognitive abilities to fully develop.204  Thus, “repeated ‘detaching’ 
and ‘re-attaching’ to people who matter . . . can lead to enduring 
problems.”205  Ultimately, interference with children’s attachment 
relationships can lead to “aggression, fearful relationships, academic 
problems in school, and . . . elevated psychopathology.”206  As the 
American Psychiatric Association’s DSM-IV confirms, repeated 
changes in caregivers is related to a child’s inability to respond 
appropriately to social situations, hypervigilance, excessive fear or 
withdrawal, and disinhibited behavior with adults.207  Courts also 
have repeatedly noted the long-term psychological harm caused by 
frequent disruption of parent-child attachments.208 
Because parent-child attachment relationships are so critical to 
a child’s cognitive, emotional, social, and psychological development, 
and because disruption of those attachment relationships 
(particularly repeated disruption) impairs the child’s ability to form 
future attachments, children need “sustained, reliable relationships 
 
 204. See generally Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of 
“Neglected” Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, 
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Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1976). 
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tantrums, intentional destruction of property, age-inappropriate sexual acting 
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Steven R. Shaw & Doris Paez, Reactive Attachment Disorder: Recognition, 
Action, and Considerations for School Social Workers, 29 CHILD. & SCH. 69, 69–
71 (2007).  For further discussion of behaviors resulting from attachment 
difficulties, see Charles H. Zeanah, Jr. & Anna T. Smyke,  Attachment 
Disorders, in HANDBOOK OF INFANT MENTAL HEALTH 421, 421–27 (Charles H. 
Zeanah, Jr. ed., 3d ed. 2009).  Reactive attachment disorder is caused by 
“pathogenic caregiving,” defined in the DSM-IV as “(1) persistent disregard of a 
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changes of primary caregiver that prevent the formation of stable attachments.”  
DSM-IV, supra, at 118. 
 208. See, e.g., LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 986  (D.D.C. 1991), 
aff’d sub nom. LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(“Prolonged stays in foster care and frequent changes in placements lead to 
[psychological] disorders . . . all too frequently.”); Braam ex rel. Braam v. State, 
81 P.3d 851, 854 & n.1 (Wash. 2003) (noting that frequent movement of children 
in foster care “may create or exacerbate existing psychological conditions, 
notably reactive attachment disorder”). 
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within the family.”209  “Paramount in the lives of . . . children is their 
need for continuity with their primary attachment figures . . . .”210 
The child’s need for a secure and stable family relationship is 
the foundation of every state’s child welfare policies.211  Florida’s 
statutory declarations of policy are typical.  They acknowledge that 
foster care “often fails to meet the needs of children” in part because 
children are “repeatedly placed” and “lack a stable environment.”212  
And they explicitly articulate the goals that “permanent placement 
with the biological or adoptive family [be] achieved as soon as 
possible for every child in foster care and that no child remain[] in 
foster care longer than 1 year.”213 
Similarly, the Florida Adoption Act states that its overarching 
purpose is “to provide to all children who can benefit by it a 
permanent family life.”214  The Act declares that “[t]he state has a 
compelling interest in providing stable and permanent homes for 
adoptive children in a prompt manner,” and that “[a]doptive 
children have the right to permanence and stability in adoptive 
placements.”215  The policy in favor of permanent and stable 
placements is so fundamental that it has been held to trump even 
the desire to maintain beneficial relationships with grandparents, 
which cannot be secured when a child is adopted.216 
As these typical declarations of public policy demonstrate, the 
states have concluded that secure and stable family relationships 
are of fundamental importance to the well-being of children.  That 
conclusion is unassailable: as the science confirms, these 
relationships are “vital in the formation of the person.”217 
III.  THE PARENTLESS CHILD’S RIGHT TO A PERMANENT FAMILY 
Given the critical importance of a secure and stable family 
relationship218 to a child’s healthy development and well-being, as 
 
 209. Nat’l Scientific Council on the Developing Child, supra note 130, at 3. 
 210. Young Children in Foster Care, supra note 184, at 1145. 
 211. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-13(8) (2010) (“The Legislature 
recognizes that the best interests of the child require that the child be placed in 
the most permanent living arrangement as soon as is practicably possible.”).  
The universality of such policies can be explained in part by the federal 
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 
(1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), which requires 
states accepting adoption subsidies from the federal government to report in 
detail how well their child welfare systems achieve permanent placements for 
children entering foster care.  See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(1)–(6) (2006). 
 212. FLA. STAT. § 409.1673(1)(a)1, (1)(b) (2009). 
 213. Id. § 39.001(1)(h). 
 214. Id. § 63.022(3). 
 215. Id. § 63.022(1)(a), (c). 
 216. See G.S. v. T.B., 985 So. 2d 978, 983 (Fla. 2008). 
 217. See Sroufe, supra note 177, at 365. 
 218. By this, we mean an enduring relationship with a primary caregiver 
that is expected to be life-long.  See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  We 
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well as its crucial role in enabling a child to achieve the essential 
skills of self-regulation and social competence and to form a sense of 
his own identity, children have a fundamental constitutional right to 
a secure and stable family relationship.219 
We start from first principles.  “[T]he protection of liberty under 
the Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental 
significance in defining the rights of the person.”220  At the very core 
of this protected liberty is “an autonomy of self that includes 
freedom of thought, belief, [and] expression.”221  “[T]he ability 
independently to define one’s identity . . . is central to any concept of 
liberty.”222  “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery 
of human life.”223 
Because “[b]eliefs about these matters could not define the 
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the 
State,”224 the Supreme Court has long accorded constitutional 
protection to family relationships, not only safeguarding existing 
relationships from intrusion,225 but also preventing the erection of 
barriers to their formation.226  There is a “private realm of family life 
which the state cannot enter.”227  “The child is not the mere creature 
of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the 
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for 
 
do not claim that children are constitutionally entitled to a “secure” attachment 
relationship as that term is used in the psychological literature.  See supra note 
138 and accompanying text (describing different categories of attachment 
relationships). 
 219. As explained in Part I, courts have not yet addressed the argument 
presented here.  In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & 
Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977) and Lofton v. Secretary of the Florida 
Department of Children & Families, 358 F.3d 804, 811–15 (11th Cir. 2004), the 
claims asserted were fundamentally different and focused on whether 
temporary foster care arrangements were entitled to constitutional protection 
from disruption.  Adoption of X.X.G. declared Florida’s categorical ban on gay 
adoption invalid on other grounds without reaching the argument presented 
here, see supra notes 6 and 77, and Cox v. Department of Health & 
Rehabilitative Services, 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995) was brought by two adults 
who did not purport to assert any claim on behalf of adoptive children. 
 220. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003).  State constitutions also 
provide substantive protection for the individual’s interest in liberty.  The 
Florida Constitution, for example, has been construed to protect “the right to 
liberty and self-determination,” State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1115 (Fla. 2004), 
and its explicit right of privacy, found in Article I, Section 23, provides even 
“more protection than the federal right.”  Id. 
 221. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
 222. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) (emphasis added). 
 223. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) 
(plurality opinion). 
 224. Id. 
 225. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
 226. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386–91 (1978). 
 227. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
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additional obligations.”228  “[I]n the culture and traditions of the 
Nation” it is families that assume a primary role in “cultivating and 
transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity 
and act as critical buffers between the individual and the power of 
the State.”229  In short, family relationships are critical to the 
independent formation of one’s core beliefs and ideals, and receive 
constitutional protection in order to safeguard the freedom of self-
definition that is “central to any concept of liberty.”230 
Additionally, “[f]amily relationships, by their nature, involve 
deep attachments and commitments,”231 and their constitutional 
protection “reflects the realization that individuals draw much of 
their emotional enrichment from close ties with others.”232  It is 
through family attachments that most of us find meaning and 
fulfillment.  The importance of family relationships in this respect 
provides part of the justification for their constitutional protection.233 
On both grounds—its importance to a child’s independent self-
definition and its importance to a child’s emotional well-being—the 
child’s interest in a secure and stable family relationship warrants 
constitutional protection.234  As explained above, an attachment 
 
 228. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
 229. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618–19 (1984); see also Moore v. 
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“It is 
through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most 
cherished values, moral and cultural.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401–
02 (1923) (noting that state-imposed collective rearing of children would do 
“violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution”). 
 230. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619. 
 231. Id. at 619–20. 
 232. Id. at 619. 
 233. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (protecting the liberty 
of consenting adults to engage in sexual conduct because “the conduct can be 
but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring”); Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (parent-child relationship is “far more 
precious than any property right”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651–52 
(1972) (describing the importance of family and familial bonds); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (“Marriage is a coming together for better 
or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.  It 
is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, 
not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.  Yet it 
is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.”); 
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (explaining that the right to “marry, establish a home 
and bring up children” is “essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness”); In re 
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 424 (Cal. 2008) (marriage is “the 
most . . . individually fulfilling relationship that one can enjoy in the course of a 
lifetime” and  “of crucial significance to the individual’s happiness and well-
being” (quoting Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So. 
2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991) (parent-child relationship is “sacrosanct”); Grissom v. 
Dade Cnty., 293 So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. 1974) (explaining that the right to establish 
a family though procreation or adoption “is so basic as to be inseparable from 
‘the right . . . to pursue happiness’” (quoting FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2)). 
 234. Of course, “[m]inors possess constitutional rights under both the federal 
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relationship with a parent is critical to a child’s healthy cognitive, 
emotional, social, and psychological development; it is essential to 
the mastery of self-regulation and social competence; and it plays a 
vital role in helping children “define who they are, what they can 
become, and how and why they are important to other people.”235  
Without a parent figure to interact with and bond to, children lack 
an essential source of feedback that they need to develop “the ability 
independently to define [their own] identity.”236  In addition, the 
attachment to a parent figure that grows out of regular interaction 
“is essential to the development of emotional security and social 
conscience,”237 and is “the cornerstone for healthy psychological 
adjustment.”238  Because a secure and stable family relationship is 
essential to protect the child’s ability to form the attachments that 
are critically important to identity development, self-regulation, 
social competence, and emotional well-being, the child’s interest in a 
secure and stable family relationship must be deemed a 
fundamental, constitutionally protected right. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION POLICY 
Because the child’s interest in a secure and stable family 
relationship is constitutionally protected as a fundamental right, the 
state must have a justification sufficient to withstand strict scrutiny 
if it adopts laws or policies that interfere with the attainment of that 
interest.239  In particular, in establishing its foster care and adoption 
policies for parentless children, the state’s choices are significantly 
constrained, contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s suggestion in 
 
and Florida constitutions.”  State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1110 (Fla. 2004); see 
also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 
1989); Holmes, supra note 19, at 385–88 (collecting cases); David D. Meyer, The 
Modest Promise of Children’s Relationship Rights, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
1117, 1117–19 (2003) (describing widespread judicial recognition of children’s 
claimed rights “in classic individual-versus-state conflicts”). 
 235. Nat’l Scientific Council on the Developing Child, supra note 130, at 1. 
 236. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619. 
 237. Young Children in Foster Care, supra note 184, at 1146. 
 238. BRODZINSKY ET AL., supra note 201, at 13. 
 239.  It is hornbook law that statutes that infringe a fundamental right 
must withstand strict scrutiny to survive.  See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
20, at 792.  Some courts are emphatic that this is the applicable standard 
whenever a fundamental right is implicated.  See, e.g., J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1109–
10 & n.3.  But some scholars have argued that the Court has applied a 
somewhat less demanding form of scrutiny in contexts where the interests of 
family members are in tension and must be balanced.  See David D. Meyer, 
Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart, 48 UCLA L. REV. 
1125, 1163 (2001); David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. 
REV. 527, 571–72 (2000) [hereinafter Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy].  
Others have questioned the continuing vitality of the Court’s fundamental 
rights/strict scrutiny doctrine in general.  See, e.g., Jeffrey Shaman, Cracks in 
the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 
161, 172 (1984). 
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Lofton.240 
To be sure, recognition of the child’s fundamental right to a 
secure and stable family relationship does not require every law or 
policy regulating foster care and adoption to pass strict scrutiny in 
order to survive.  Zablocki v. Redhail241 is instructive.  There, the 
Court struck down a statute restricting the ability of persons in 
arrears on child support to marry, applying strict scrutiny on the 
basis that marriage is a fundamental right.242  The Court disclaimed 
the view that “every state regulation which relates in any way 
to . . . marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny.  To the 
contrary, reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere 
with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may 
legitimately be imposed.”243  But the statute at issue did significantly 
interfere: those lacking the means necessary to cure their 
delinquent support obligations were “absolutely prevented from 
getting married,” and even for others, the statute’s requirements 
were sufficiently burdensome to represent “a serious intrusion into 
their freedom of choice.”244 
By the same token, the state is free to regulate foster care and 
adoption in ways that do not significantly interfere with the 
attainment of a permanent family relationship.  For example, 
regulations requiring an investigation and home study to confirm 
that a proposed adoption is suitable and in the child’s best interest 
would not appear to infringe the child’s right to a secure and stable 
family relationship: even though they may delay the completion of 
adoption proceedings,245 they help assure that the proposed adoption 
will in fact provide the child with a permanent family.246 
In theory, a state could even decide to abolish adoption 
altogether, so long as it vindicated the child’s right to a permanent 
family relationship under a different legal rubric.  From the child’s 
perspective, attachments form regardless of biological or legal 
connections with the caregiver.247  While formal legal recognition of 
 
 240. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
 241. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 242. Id. at 383–91.  But see Meyer, supra note 19, at 915 & nn.132–33 
(suggesting that the Court’s “ambiguous verbiage” in Zablocki signaled “a more 
flexible form of scrutiny”). 
 243. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386. 
 244. Id. at 387. 
 245. Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 410 (1975) (holding that the delay in 
obtaining divorce caused by a six-month residency requirement did not infringe 
on the right to marriage). 
 246. Indeed, even with regulations requiring such an assessment, many 
adoptive placements ultimately fail, and the parent returns the child to the 
custody of the state.  See Woodhouse, supra note 19, at 318 n.136 (reporting 
that 10% to 25% of adoptions disrupt prior to finalization, and another 1% to 
10% dissolve after the adoption is finalized). 
 247. For a general discussion related to this point, see St. Petersburg-USA 
Orphanage Research Team, The Effects of Early Social-Emotional and 
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the parent-child relationship provides a host of benefits,248 including 
 
Relationship Experience on the Development of Young Orphanage Children, 73 
MONOGRAPHS SOC’Y FOR RES. CHILD DEV., no. 3, 2008 at 1; see also GOLDSTEIN ET 
AL., supra note 128, at 27; NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 106, at 234; 
Susanne Bennett, Is There a Primary Mom?  Parental Perceptions of 
Attachment Bond Hierarchies Within Lesbian Adoptive Families, 20 CHILD & 
ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 159, 161 (2003); Marty et al., supra note 206, at 271, 
273. 
 248. Legal recognition of the parent-child relationship through adoption 
enhances the child’s sense of security, belonging, and psychological well-being, 
promoting a stronger sense of self and more favorable outcomes in terms of 
personal, social, and economic functioning.  See David D. Meyer, Family Ties: 
Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 
753, 798–803 (1999) (summarizing studies); John Triseliotis & Malcolm Hill, 
Contrasting Adoption, Foster Care, and Residential Rearing, in THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 107, 111 (David M. Brodzinsky and Marshall D. 
Schechter eds., 1990); John Triseliotis, Long-Term Foster Care or Adoption?  
The Evidence Examined, 7 CHILD & FAM. SOC. WORK 23, 31 (2002).  In part this 
can be explained by the legal significance of adoption: adopted children need not 
worry that child welfare workers will intrude into their lives or take them away 
from their home.  See Meyer, supra, at 801 (noting the persistence of such fears 
in foster children despite foster parents’ efforts to provide a sense of belonging 
and security); Triseliotis, supra, at 28 (noting that the lack of legal security in 
foster care creates a “continual state of anxiety” over possible termination of 
placement). 
In part, the explanation lies in the social and cultural significance of 
adoption: adoption signifies (to the child and others) that the child “really” 
belongs to and is part of the adoptive family.  See Triseliotis & Hill, supra, at 
113–15 (noting significant change in status perceived by children who were 
adopted by their foster parents, who previously felt their “full family 
membership” was “called into question in the eyes of outsiders”); Woodhouse, 
supra note 19, at 323–24 (noting that “alternatives to adoption, even permanent 
guardianship,” lack “the societal, cultural, and legal significance” of adoption, 
which is perceived as providing “a ‘real’ home and a ‘real’ family”) (quoting 
Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 824 (11th 
Cir. 2004)); see also Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, How Much Does 
Legal Status Matter? Adoptions by Kin Caregivers, 36 FAM. L.Q. 449, 467–69 
(2002) (suggesting that the social and legal status of adoption as contrasted 
with that of foster care and kinship care explains the poorer outcomes for 
children who are not adopted); Meyer, supra, at 806 (“Laws that give a child’s 
caregivers the status of long-term custodians but deny them the status of 
parents carry an explicit social meaning, that the caregivers are something less 
than true parents to the child and that the living arrangement thus created is 
something less than a true family.”).  
In addition, the legal insecurity of foster parent relationships may cause 
individuals to “hold back” in their commitment to and emotional investment in 
those relationships, impairing the quality of bonding and attachment that 
occurs.  See Meyer, supra note 234, at  1125–26 (suggesting that “substantial 
legal insecurity in the relationship between children and their adult 
caregivers—at least when it relates to doubts about the continuity of custody or 
future contact with the child—can impair the quality of bonding”); Meyer, 
supra, at 798–802 (arguing from a variety of studies and sources that 
“insecurity concerning the continuity of a loving relationship negatively affects 
the bonding process between adult and child”); see also In re Marriage Cases, 
183 P.3d 384, 424 (Cal. 2008) (describing importance of the security provided by 
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some that are of constitutional dimension,249 legal recognition is not 
itself essential for the child’s development into an autonomous 
adult.250  Rather, what matters is that the family relationships are in 
fact secure from disruption.251  Thus, for example, if children in 
foster care were placed permanently with their foster family, and 
the parents and children understood that the family relationships 
were as a practical matter (if not legally) secure from disruption, the 
child’s interest in a permanent family relationship likely would be 
satisfied despite the absence of full legal recognition of the parent-
child relationship.252 
 
legal recognition of the marital relationship, enabling the spouses to rely on 
each other’s commitment to the relationship and thereby enhancing their own 
commitments and attachments to each other); Meyer, supra note 19, at 909 
(“Marriage brings with it legal incidents and social norms that reinforce 
commitment and encourage deeper investment by the participants.”). 
 249. Under legal regimes such as foster care and permanent guardianship 
the state significantly intrudes into the family and deprives it of the autonomy, 
permanence, and stability that legally recognized families possess.  See G.S. v. 
T.B., 985 So. 2d 978, 984 (Fla. 2008).  Such intrusion into family autonomy is 
contrary to the “ideas . . . upon which our institutions rest.”  Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923); see also Meyer, supra note 19, at 895 (arguing that 
second-class legal status selectively imposed on certain family relationships 
implicates the constitutional right of family privacy).  See generally supra notes 
220–30 and accompanying text. 
 250. See Greg Kelly, The Survival of Long-Term Foster Care, in ISSUES IN 
FOSTER CARE 12, 32 (Greg Kelly & Robbie Gilligan eds., 2002) (explaining that 
children “have the opportunity to make satisfactory attachment relationships” 
in foster care); see also Lauren Frey et al., Achieving Permanency for Youth in 
Foster Care: Assessing and Strengthening Emotional Security, 13 CHILD &  FAM. 
SOC. WORK 218, 220 (2008) (noting that placement stability in foster care can 
provide a sense of security and belonging, and encourage the development of 
trusting relationships); Gillian Schofield & Mary Beek, Growing Up in Foster 
Care: Providing a Secure Base Through Adolescence, 14 CHILD & FAM. SOC. 
WORK 255, 259 (2009) (describing the ability of foster care to provide a secure 
base for children through family membership, which typically requires support 
into adulthood). 
 251. See Kelly, supra note 250, at 33; Janet Lahti, A Follow-Up Study of 
Foster Children in Permanent Placements, 56 SOC. SERV. REV. 556, 567–68 
(1982) (reporting higher child well-being scores “[w]here placements were seen 
as permanent by the parents,” regardless of whether “the child was in  legally 
permanent placement . . . or in legally temporary foster care”). 
 252. However, it is difficult to conceive what legitimate purpose would be 
served by relegating these children to such a second-class legal status.  See 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding 
that the prohibition of same-sex marriage furthers no legitimate governmental 
purpose and violates the due process and equal protection guarantees of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by imposing second-class legal status on same-sex 
couples); see also Meyer, supra note 19, at 895 (arguing that second-class legal 
status selectively imposed on certain family relationships implicates the 
constitutional right of family privacy).  Thus, while permanent foster care or 
guardianship could theoretically satisfy the child’s interest in a secure and 
stable family relationship, such a regime would implicate different 
constitutional concerns. 
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But the realities of foster care in the United States are quite 
different.  Nationwide, two-thirds of children in foster care for two 
years or longer suffer repeated disruption of their placements.253  In 
Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi and Utah—the four states with 
categorical restrictions on who may adopt—the record is far worse, 
with as many as five out of six of these children experiencing three 
or more placements.254  Recent data255 show that for vast numbers of 
children in foster care, the instability of placements is extreme: 
131,652 children had five or more placements; 34,782 had ten or 
more; and 5034 had twenty or more.256  Plainly, as even state 
legislatures have acknowledged, foster care “often fails to meet the 
needs of children” because children are “repeatedly placed” and “lack 
a stable environment.”257 
Given these realities of the foster care system, categorical 
restrictions on the pool of adoptive parents significantly interfere 
with the attainment of a permanent family relationship for 
parentless children in the state’s care.  By disqualifying a group of 
adults from adopting regardless of their ability to parent, the system 
 
 253. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD 
WELFARE OUTCOMES 2003–2006, at 29 tbl.V-1 (2010), available at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cwo03-06/cwo03-06.pdf (reporting a 
state-by-state median of only 32.1% with two or fewer placements). 
 254. See id. at 56 tbl.6.1 (reporting Arkansas data showing 82.6% of children 
experiencing three or more placements); id. at 92 tbl.6.1 (reporting Florida data 
showing 71.1% of children experiencing three or more placements); id. at 185 
tbl.6.1 (reporting Mississippi data showing 66.9% of children experiencing three 
or more placements); id. at 324 tbl.6.1 (reporting Utah data showing 85.2% of 
children experiencing three or more placements). 
 255. NAT’L DATA ARCHIVE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, AFCARS DATA FOR 
2007: DATASET NUMBER 143, at app. C, element 24 (2009).  The data set forth 
here were made available by the National Data Archive on Child Abuse and 
Neglect, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, and have been used with permission.  
Data from the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System 
(“AFCARS”) were originally collected by the Children’s Bureau.  Funding for the 
project was provided by the Children’s Bureau, Administration on Children, 
Youth, and Families, Administration for Children and Families, U.S. 
 Department of Health and Human Services.  The collector of the original data, 
the funder, NDACAN, Cornell University, and their agents or employees bear 
no responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here. 
Appendix C reports the data on the current foster care episode.  Element 
24 specifies how many different placement settings the child has experienced in 
this foster care episode.  The total number of children with data points on foster 
placements was 782,984.  The minimum number of placements reported in the 
AFCARS data was one, and the maximum number was ninety-three.  Using 
SPSS (a statistical program used to analyze social and behavioral science data) 
we calculated the number of the 782,984 children who had been in each 
frequency of placement, ranging from one to ninety-three placements, and 
derived the number of children with five or more placements (for example) by 
summing the number of children at each data point between five and ninety-
three placements. 
 256. Id. 
 257. FLA. STAT. § 409.1673(1)(a)1, (1)(b) (2009). 
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limits children’s opportunity to become part of a stable family.  Like 
the statute struck down in Zablocki, the categorical exclusions 
mandated by the Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, and Utah 
statutes258 impose an absolute legal bar to a child’s adoption when 
the person otherwise eligible to adopt falls within the terms of the 
statute.259  Such restrictions therefore must have some compelling 
justification to pass constitutional muster.260 
 
 258. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. 
 259. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-8-304(a) (2009) (“A minor may not be 
adopted . . . if the individual seeking to adopt . . . is cohabiting with a sexual 
partner outside of a marriage that is valid under the Arkansas Constitution and 
the laws of this state.”); FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2009) (“No person eligible to 
adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.”); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(2) (2010) (“Adoption by couples of the same gender is 
prohibited.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) (LexisNexis 2008) (“A child may 
not be adopted by a person who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a 
legally valid and binding marriage under the laws of this state.”). 
 260. No such justification exists, at least from the standpoint of child welfare 
concerns.  First, gay people and straight people make equally good parents.  See 
Rachel H. Farr et al., Parenting and Child Development in Adoptive Families: 
Does Parental Sexual Orientation Matter?, 14 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 164, 
175 (2010); Nanette Gartrell & Henny Bos, U.S. National Longitudinal Lesbian 
Family Study: Psychological Adjustment of 17-Year-Old Adolescents, 126 
PEDIATRICS 28, 34 (2010); see also Brief for Am. Psychological Ass’n. as Amicus 
Curae Supporting Appellee at 13–20, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. 
Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G. 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (No. 3D08-
3044), available at http://www.apa.org/about/offices/ogc/amicus/xxg-nrg.pdf 
(collecting studies regarding the suitability of gay and straight people as 
parents); Adoption and Co-Parenting of Children by Same-Sex Couples: Position 
Statement, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (2002), http://www.psych.org/Departments 
/EDU/Library/APAOfficialDocumentsandRelated/PositionStatements 
/200214.aspx (“Numerous studies over the last three decades consistently 
demonstrate that children raised by gay or lesbian parents exhibit the same 
level of emotional, cognitive, social, and sexual functioning as children raised by 
heterosexual parents.”).  The exclusions imposed by the Florida and Mississippi 
statutes are thus factually insupportable on child welfare grounds. 
Second, even if there were genuine child welfare concerns that some in the 
excluded groups were not fit parents, categorically excluding everyone in those 
groups is not narrowly tailored to address those concerns.  Cf. Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654 (1972) (explaining that even if “most unmarried 
fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents,” the state may not categorically 
deem them unfit, since “some are wholly suited to have custody of their 
children”); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1965) (holding that the state 
may not categorically deem service members to be nonresidents when it is 
feasible to assess residency on an individualized basis).  Indeed, all four states’ 
categorical exclusions exist in the context of a regulatory regime that requires 
individual screening, and that mandates that the child’s best interest be the 
court’s paramount concern.  See ARK CODE ANN. § 9-9-214(c) (2009) (authorizing 
issuance of adoption decree only if “the court determines that . . . the adoption is 
in the best interest of the individual to be adopted”); FLA. STAT. § 63.022(2) 
(2009) (“[I]n every adoption, the best interest of the child should govern and be 
of foremost concern in the court’s determination.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-11 
(2010) (requiring home study to determine whether the petitioners are suitable 
parents for the child and whether the proposed adoption is in the child’s best 
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Similarly, in light of the extensive period of time many children 
remain in foster care,261 laws or policies preventing the formation of 
parent-child attachments in foster care would merit strict scrutiny.  
For example, if a state decided to provide foster care solely in 
faceless institutional settings,262 or to regularly move children from 
home to home in order to prevent the formation of attachments,263 
the policy would implicate the child’s fundamental right to a secure 
and stable family relationship. 
V.  RECONCILING PARENTAL RIGHTS WITH THE CHILD’S RIGHT TO A 
PERMANENT PARENT 
A number of objections might be raised to recognition of a 
child’s substantive due process right to a permanent family 
relationship.  First, it could be asserted that any constitutional 
interest a child has in a family relationship necessarily mirrors the 
corresponding liberty interest of the parent, and so need not be 
given separate recognition or analysis.264  Second, given that the law 
historically did not recognize an independent right of a child to 
establish or maintain a family relationship,265 it could be argued that 
 
interest); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-102(1) (LexisNexis 2008) (stating that the 
primary concern of the court in adoption cases is the best interest of the child). 
In such a context, the categorical exclusion effectively instructs the court to 
disregard the child’s best interest in cases where the categorical exclusion 
applies.  That instruction necessarily fails to promote child welfare concerns, 
unless every person so excluded would not be a fit parent. 
 261. Nationwide, about 60% of the children entering foster care for the first 
time remain in foster care twelve months or longer.  See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, 
supra note 253, at 19 tbl.IV-1.  For those who are ultimately adopted, the 
median length of stay in foster care prior to adoption is more than two and a 
half years.  Id. at 23 tbl.IV-4. 
 262. Cf. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 315 (1993) (upholding the temporary 
confinement of unaccompanied children awaiting deportation in institutions 
meeting minimal constitutional standards).  Even in institutional settings, 
attachments can form where the caregiving environment is deliberately 
structured not to be “faceless” but to foster relationships between a child and 
specific caregivers.  See St. Petersburg-USA Orphanage Research Team, supra 
note 247, at 235–38. 
 263. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 
836 n.40, 838 n.41 (1977) (describing then-existing New York policy of moving 
children in foster care to prevent the formation of emotional attachments); Doe 
ex rel. Johanns v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 670 F. Supp. 1145, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987) (challenging a system of “overnight” foster care placements). 
 264. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989) (plurality 
opinion); Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 
811–12, 814 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 265. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and 
Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1043–50 (1992); 
see also Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright, supra note 19, at 803–05 
(explaining that “the constitutional personhood and rights-bearing status of 
children” was not “firmly established” until “after World War II”).  But see id. at 
799–807 (arguing that a child’s right not to be placed with unfit parents is 
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no substantive due process right of a child to a permanent family 
relationship can exist, because such a right finds no footing in the 
history and traditions of our nation.266  Third, to the extent that 
recognition of this right is extended to contexts in which a 
conflicting right of a parent is present, it could be argued that 
recognition of the child’s right would undermine the constitutional 
protection of parental authority and family autonomy.267 
A. Does a Child’s Constitutional Interest in a Family Relationship 
Merely Mirror the Parent’s? 
Courts sometimes fail to give full consideration to claims 
asserted on behalf of children seeking constitutional protection of 
their family relationships, asserting summarily that the child’s 
interest merely mirrors the claim of the parent.268  For example, in 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., a plurality of the Supreme Court analyzed 
and rejected the substantive due process claim of the biological 
 
nevertheless sufficiently “rooted in our traditions” to be recognized as a 
substantive due process right). 
 266. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997); 
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6 (plurality opinion); United States v. Flores-
Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 998 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3537 (U.S. 
Mar. 22, 2010) (No. 09-5801). 
 267. This concern was central to the Court’s decision in Michael H. v. Gerald 
D.: “Here, to provide protection to [the child’s relationship with her] adulterous 
natural father is to deny protection to [her] marital father [in directing her 
upbringing], and vice versa.”  Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130 (plurality opinion); 
see also Smith, 431 U.S. 846–47 (suggesting that a child’s constitutional rights 
may be “substantially attenuated” when they conflict with constitutional rights 
of parents). 
 268. See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131 (plurality opinion); Lofton, 358 
F.3d at 811–12, 814.  However, as David D. Meyer has noted, numerous court 
decisions have upheld claims that “children possess their own constitutional 
rights to maintain important family relationships.”  Meyer, supra note 234, at 
1119.  Indeed, some courts have robustly asserted the independence of the 
child’s constitutional interests from the parent’s.  See, e.g., In re Jasmon O., 878 
P.2d 1297, 1307 (Cal. 1994) (“Children are not simply chattels belonging to the 
parent, but have fundamental interests of their own that may diverge from the 
interests of the parent.”); Oldfield v. Benavidez, 867 P.2d 1167, 1172 (N.M. 
1994) (“Although parents have certain rights regarding their children, the 
children also have certain fundamental rights which often compete with the 
parents’ interests.”); In re Guardianship of Victoria R., 201 P.3d 169, 173–74 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 203 P.3d 102 (N.M. 2009) (affirming a 
guardianship order giving custody of a child to long-term caregivers over a fit 
parent’s objection and noting that the child “is herself a ‘person’ for purposes of 
the Fourteenth Amendment”); Clifford K. v. Paul S., 619 S.E.2d 138, 159 (W. 
Va. 2005) (“A child has rights, too, some of which are of a constitutional 
magnitude.”).  See generally Suellyn Scarnecchia, A Child’s Right to Protection 
from Transfer Trauma in a Contested Adoption Case, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL’Y 41 (1995) (asserting that children in contested adoption cases have 
independent constitutional rights, including a right to protect existing 
relationships with nonbiological parents and a right to be free from state-
imposed psychological or emotional harm). 
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father to maintain a relationship with his daughter, and then 
disposed of the daughter’s claim by stating simply that her claim 
was “the obverse” of her father’s and “fail[ed] for the same 
reasons.”269 
This is error, for at least two separate reasons.  First, the child’s 
interest and the parent’s interest in a parent-child relationship are 
analytically distinct.270  For the parent, the right to “establish a 
home and bring up children” is “essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness”271 in part because of the meaning and sense of fulfillment 
it gives to the parent’s life.272  It is doubtful that children typically 
draw the same sense of fulfillment from teaching their parents.273  
On the other hand, “[t]here is good reason . . . to think that the 
consequences for relationship disruption are not identical for 
children and adults,”274 and that those consequences may well be far 
more significant for children.275  On a variety of grounds, then, the 
child’s interest in the relationship is distinct from that of the parent, 
and therefore requires separate analysis.276 
Second, regardless of whether the child’s interest in a family 
relationship mirrors the parent’s, children in state custody have an 
additional constitutional claim under Youngberg that the parent 
lacks.  That claim, we have argued, requires the state to provide at 
least minimally adequate nurturing to the children in its care, in 
order to vindicate their liberty interests in healthy development into 
autonomous adults.277  Thus, regardless of whether the constitution 
protects the family relationships of foster parents and foster 
children, for example, the parentless child in state custody has a 
constitutional claim that stands on its own footing and merits 
 
 269. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131 (plurality opinion). 
 270. In other contexts, the Court has rejected such an identity of interests, 
refusing to conclude, for example, that because parents have a fundamental 
right to procreate, a developing fetus has a corresponding fundamental right to 
be born.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156–59 (1973). 
 271. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 272. See supra notes 231–33 and accompanying text. 
 273.  But see CROSBY, STILLS, NASH & YOUNG, Teach Your Children, on DÉJÀ 
VU (Atlantic Records 1970) (suggesting the child’s parallel role in passing along 
values and beliefs to parents). 
 274. Meyer, supra note 234, at 1128. 
 275. See supra Part II.D. 
 276. In addition to the distinctions elaborated above, a child’s reasonable 
expectations as to the permanence of a relationship may well be different from 
those of a parent who is on notice of the state’s right to terminate it.  See Fla. 
Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 98 
n.19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (Salter, J., concurring); see also Holmes, supra 
note 19, at 383 (critiquing the “parent-centered” nature of courts’ analyses of 
liberty interests in child-parent relationships for “overlook[ing] any liberty 
interest the child may have”); Woodhouse, supra note 19, at 319–20 (critiquing 
courts’ treatment of a child’s right to be adopted as the mirror image of an 
adult’s right to adopt). 
 277. See supra Part I.A. 
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independent analysis.  It is wrong, therefore, for courts to dispose of 
the child’s claims by asserting that those claims merely mirror the 
claims of the parent. 
B. Does Substantive Due Process Protect Only Narrowly Defined 
Liberty Interests that Are Deeply Rooted in the Nation’s History and 
Traditions? 
The recognition of children as persons capable of having 
cognizable constitutional and legal rights is a relatively recent 
development in the law.278  Accordingly, some courts have summarily 
rejected substantive due process claims asserted on behalf of 
children, relying on a theory that only those narrowly defined liberty 
interests that are deeply rooted in the nation’s history and 
traditions can receive protection under the doctrine of substantive 
due process.279  To be sure, Washington v. Glucksberg does suggest 
that any asserted substantive due process right must be “carefully 
descri[bed]” and be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
traditions.”280  Justice Scalia has maintained the even more 
restrictive view that the doctrine extends only to those rights—
described at “the most specific level” of generality—that are so 
rooted in tradition.281  But a majority of the Court has expressly 
repudiated that view,282 and even the formulation in Glucksberg is 
hard to reconcile with a host of decisions ranging from Loving v. 
 
 278. See Woodhouse, supra note 265, at 1043–50; see also Dwyer, A 
Constitutional Birthright, supra note 19, at 805 (explaining that “the 
constitutional personhood and rights-bearing status of children” was not “firmly 
established” until “after World War II”). 
 279. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130–31 (1989) (plurality 
opinion); United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 998 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. 
granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3537 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2010) (No. 09-5801). 
 280. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. 
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 281. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127–28 n.6 (plurality opinion) (suggesting that 
the proper due process inquiry is whether legal traditions protected parental 
rights of an adulterous natural father, not whether legal traditions protected 
parental rights of natural fathers in general). 
 282. See id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I concur in all but footnote 6 
of Justice Scalia’s opinion.  This footnote sketches a mode of historical 
analysis . . . that may be somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions in this 
area.”); id. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I do not agree with 
Justice Scalia’s analysis.”); id. at 137–41 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The 
plurality’s interpretive method is more than novel; it is misguided.”); see also 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (“As the Constitution endures, 
persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for 
greater freedom.”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 
(1992) (plurality opinion) (“Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of 
States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the 
outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects.”). 
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Virginia283 to Lawrence v. Texas.284 
As numerous scholars have noted, the Court’s substantive due 
process decisions generally follow one of two distinct patterns of 
analysis.  Either the Court emphasizes the nation’s history and 
traditions, or the Court grounds its analysis on the importance to 
the individual of the particular liberty interest in question, as 
balanced against society’s legitimate concerns.285  As David Meyer 
has suggested, “the Court emphasizes the importance of historical 
consensus when it wishes to deny constitutional protection and 
downplays it when it is otherwise inclined to extend protection.”286  
Thus, the historical legal status of children should not prevent the 
recognition of their right to a permanent family relationship.287  At 
least for parentless children in the state’s custody, that right follows 
directly from Youngberg v. Romeo and the Court’s numerous 
substantive due process decisions protecting intimate family 
relationships.288 
C. Would Recognition of the Child’s Right to a Permanent Family 
Relationship Undermine the Constitutional Protection of the Family? 
All children, not just those without parents, need a permanent 
family relationship.  If the law recognizes a constitutional claim of 
children without parents to such a relationship, the question arises 
whether that right also should be recognized for children with 
parents. 
Potentially, recognition of the child’s constitutional claim in 
contexts where it is in tension with the rights of a parent could have 
far-reaching consequences.  For example, it could be claimed that 
the child’s constitutional interest in a relationship with the parent is 
sufficient to require the parent to undergo unwanted life-saving 
medical treatment, or to prohibit the parent from relocating in the 
context of divorce.289  One scholar has gone so far as to suggest that 
the constitutional rights of newborn children trump the interests of 
their natural parents and can justify the state in taking them at 
 
 283. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 284. 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The 
“Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 
1921–25 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence marks Glucksberg “as a failed bid by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist to curb the reach of substantive due process”). 
 285. See, e.g., Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright, supra note 19, at 798–99; 
Meyer, supra note 234, at 1122–23. 
 286. Meyer, supra note 234, at 1124; see also Meyer, The Paradox of Family 
Privacy, supra note 239, at 562–63. 
 287. See Meyer, supra note 234, at 1124; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 
(“As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its 
principles in their own search for greater freedom.”). 
 288. See supra Parts I.A & III. 
 289. See Binder, supra note 12, at 1174–75 (suggesting that a child’s 
relationship interests should be taken into account and be balanced against the 
parent’s autonomy interests in these contexts). 
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birth and giving them to adoptive parents.290 
Whatever one thinks of these possible outcomes, serious 
objections could be raised if the child’s right to a permanent parent 
were extended to contexts in which it conflicts with a parent’s 
rights.  As Mark Brown has argued, “Extending rights to children 
that are independent of the rights of their parents invites extensive 
governmental intervention into existing family units.”291  That 
intervention might undermine the effort and commitment parents 
bring to the parent-child relationship,292 and diminish the quality of 
parent-child attachments.293  Moreover, as Emily Buss has noted, 
children cannot assert their own rights; some adult must stand as 
surrogate to assert the child’s rights for her.294  Thus, where those 
rights stand in tension with the rights of a parent, the pragmatic 
effect of recognizing them is to substitute another surrogate for the 
parent, and there is no reason to think other surrogates will do a 
better job in protecting the child’s interests than a parent would.295 
At a minimum, Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for 
Equality & Reform makes it clear that the constitutional claims of a 
child are attenuated when they conflict with the rights of a natural 
parent.296  And, as noted in Troxel v. Granville, it may interfere with 
the parent’s fundamental right to family integrity even to give a 
child legal standing to assert a claim.297  We believe that exploration 
of this complex subject is an appropriate matter for further 
 
 290. Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright, supra note 19, at 835.  For a more 
comprehensive exposition of Dwyer’s views, see generally DWYER, supra note 19. 
 291. Mark R. Brown, Closing the Crusade: A Brief Response to Professor 
Woodhouse, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 331, 333 (2005); see also Margaret F. Brinig, 
Troxel and the Limits of Community, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 733, 764–65 (2001); 
Elizabeth S. Scott, Parental Autonomy and Children’s Welfare, 11 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 1071, 1100 (2003).  But see Holmes, supra note 19, at 405 
(suggesting that recognition of a child’s interest in preserving attachment 
relationships need not interfere with parental rights of custody). 
 292. See Brinig, supra note 291, at 765 (“Granting rights to third parties 
disrupts the intimacy and autonomy necessary for families—marriages and 
children—to thrive.”); Scott, supra note 291, at 1080, 1097 (arguing that legal 
regulation interfering with parental authority and discretion “makes the job of 
being a parent less rewarding” and “diminishes [parents’] investment in the 
relationship”); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 
VA. L. REV. 2401, 2414 (1995). 
 293. See Meyer, supra note 234, at 1125 (suggesting that “[f]or many 
parents . . . immunity from second-guessing . . . may be an essential incentive to 
their full and unqualified investment in the hard work of parenting,” which in 
turn “may be vitally important to the bonding of parent and child”). 
 294. Emily Buss, Children’s Associational Rights?: Why Less Is More, 11 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1101, 1104 (2003). 
 295. Id. 
 296. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 
846–47 (1977). 
 297. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000) (plurality opinion); id. at 101 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Buss, supra note 294, at 1107, 1115. 
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consideration.298  Accordingly, at present we limit our claims to 
contexts in which no competing right of a parent exists.299 
CONCLUSION 
We have argued that children in state custody have a 
substantive liberty interest in a secure and stable family 
relationship, because such a relationship is essential in order for 
these children to attain the capacities needed to function as 
autonomous adults.  Without an enduring attachment to a primary 
caregiver, children are not likely to achieve the self-regulation and 
social competence necessary to function as autonomous adults, nor 
will they receive the essential feedback they need to develop a sense 
of “who they are, what they can become, and how and why they are 
important to other people.”300  A secure and stable family 
relationship is therefore a component of the minimally adequate 
nurturing that the state is constitutionally obligated to provide to 
parentless children in its custody, and this constitutional obligation 
constrains the state’s choices in establishing its foster care and 
adoption policies.  In particular, given the unstable placements that 
typify foster care in the United States, laws and regulations that 
categorically disqualify a class of people from adopting work a direct 
and substantial interference with the child’s right to a secure and 
stable family relationship, and therefore must survive strict scrutiny 
in order to pass muster.  However, careful thought is needed before 
the child’s right is extended to contexts in which it conflicts with the 
rights of a parent. 
 
 298. See generally Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children’s 
Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REV. 267 (1995); Michael S. Wald, Children’s Rights: A 
Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255 (1979) (proposing four 
categories of children’s rights and describing claimed rights against parents as 
presenting “the most controversial and the most complex questions”); 
Symposium, The Relationship Rights of Children, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
843 (2003). 
 299. As several scholars have noted, not all claims for the recognition of 
children’s rights stand on an equal footing: those which demand that the state 
respect a fundamental interest of the child do not generate the same objections 
as those which make the same demand of a parent.  See Meyer, supra note 234, 
at 1117–19 (describing different judicial reactions to children’s claimed rights 
“in classic individual-versus-state conflicts” as distinguished from conflicts 
posing a challenge “to the authority of parents”); Wald, supra note 298, at 270 
(contrasting a claim that a school “should not be able to dictate to children and 
their parents the length of children’s hair” with a claim that children should 
have a legally enforceable right against their parents “not to cut their hair if 
their parents want it cut”); Lynn D. Wardle, The Use and Abuse of Rights 
Rhetoric: The Constitutional Rights of Children, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 321, 332–
39 (1996) (criticizing efforts to infuse “rights” into parent-child relationships but 
suggesting that rights of children against the state should be recognized). 
 300. Nat’l Scientific Council on the Developing Child, supra note 130, at 1. 
